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ABSTRACT
Three Essays in Trade and International Development
by
Nii Amon Neequaye, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2015
Major Professor: Dr. Reza Oladi
Department: Applied Economics
This dissertation studies three different topics in international trade and development.
It studies the inter-laced relationship between corruption and economic growth, as well as
exploring linkages between merchandise and service trade. In addition, it evaluates the
effectiveness of foreign direct investments and environmental aid on emissions in developing
countries.
The first essay studies the path of corruption at various development stages. In particular, using a neoclassical growth model, it provides a theoretical framework to study
corruption level at various stages of development. I derive a testable proposition that corruption and income have an inverted u-shaped relationship. I then apply our theory to a
panel data of 75 countries during 2001-2008. After controlling for other related variables
such as government expenditures, trade openness, etc., the empirical results indeed support
the theory by suggesting an inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income.
The second essay explores merchandise and services trade both theoretically and empirically using the gravity approach. It uses a general equilibrium framework to show that
merchandise and service trade may be simultaneously determined. Our empirical analysis
indeed supports our proposition regarding the simultaneity of merchandise and service trade.

iv
The third essay examines the effects of foreign direct investment inflows and environmental aid disbursements on environmental degradation using panel data for some selected
developing countries. Using a fixed effects model, the estimates suggest the existence of an
Environmental Kuznets Curve for carbon dioxide as well as total green house gas emissions
from the energy and industrial sectors but there was no evidence of this phenomenon for
nitrous oxide and total green house gas emissions from the waste sector. I also find a hint of
a technique effect, and investigate it further by exploring the responsiveness of capital and
labor to investment inflows in the respective developing countries.
(116 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Three Essays in Trade and International Development

This dissertation studies how society views corruption at different stages of economic
development. It develops a theoretical framework that shows that at low levels of income
or development, corruption increases and at high levels of income and development, corruption decreases. This theoretical proposition is also investigated empirically. The empirical
analyses support the proposed theory and hint that fiscal policy, socioeconomic conditions,
and incidences of war play significant roles in determining a country’s corruption level.
In addition, this dissertation also explores the relationship between merchandise and
service trade. I show theoretically that the two are related and determined simultaneously.
An empirical investigation also confirms this proposition.
Lastly, I investigate the issue of pollution in developing countries. I explore the existence
of an inverted u-shaped relationship between emissions and income. I examine the role
played by foreign investment in improving emissions in developing countries. The results
support the inverted u-shaped relationship and suggest that environmental aid does not
reduce emissions in developing countries.
Nii Amon Neequaye
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I dedicate this work to my entire family, especially my parents for nursing this dream. This
work is a tribute to you.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation intends to explore three main areas in international trade and development that affect the economy of countries. The goal of these essays is to draw attention
to issues that countries face at different stages of development and how they affect the
economies of these countries.
The first essay studies the relationship between corruption and income; It analyzes how
society reacts to anti-corruption at different levels of development and proves the possibility
of an inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income. Corruption has been
an issue plaguing our societies from time immemorial; Tanzi (1998) explains that books
may have been written thousands of years back in an attempt to explain corruption. Some
countries have even set up anti-corruption institutions in a bid to curtail it. Whilst most
cultures frown at it others consider it as a means to an end. Tsalikis and Nwachukwu (1991)
explain how people’s cultures affect their views or perspectives on corruption. What really
causes corruption? Price controls, law wages, taxes, inefficient regulations, trade restrictions,
culture, natural resources (rent seeking behaviors), and the incidence of war may explain
corruption levels in a country (see for example Tsalikis and Nwachukwu, 1991; Besley and
McLaren, 1993; and Mauro, 1997).
Corruption may have dire consequences for the economy of countries, this explains
why countries invest a lot of money and resources into monitoring institutions and law
enforcement. Some literature argue that corruption erodes economic growth and societal
developments. Others also argue that corruption is not entirely bad and could ensure Pareto
efficiency in situations where government policies and reforms have failed. One might wonder
where the line needs be drawn in relation to the positive and negative effects of corruption.
What exactly induces corrupt activities in a society? Are corrupt activities results of need
or greed? There is a need to not only investigate the consequences of corruption but also
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to explore factors that cause corruption as well as investigate the reason why developing
countries are generally more corrupt than developed ones. Thus, this essay develops a
theoretical model that investigates corruption at different phases of economic development.
It proposes that there may exist a positive relationship between corruption and income at
low income levels and a negative one at high income levels, thereby suggesting an inverted
u-shaped relationship between corruption and income. Empirically, this essay tests this
proposition using a two-way fixed effects model and finds supports for it. It also finds
evidence that fiscal policy, socioeconomic conditions and wars influence corruption.
The second essay focuses on trade in merchandise and services. Economists in recent
years have used the gravity model extensively. However, most papers focus on trade in merchandise consequently, trade in services has not received as much coverage as merchandise
trade. Kimura and Lee (2006) have attempted to explore linkages between merchandise
and services trade. For that reason, this essay builds on existing literature by developing
a gravity equation that suggests a possible simultaneous relationship between merchandise
and service trade and assesses how distance or remoteness affect trade flows. It also tests
this proposition empirically using a panel dataset on OECD countries and a two-way fixed
effects model. The empirical analysis confirm the proposed simultaneous relationship.
Economic literature widely accepts that trade can be mutually beneficial for the trading
parties if they produce the goods for which they have a comparative advantage. Pollution
levels in developing countries are generally lower than those of the developed world, however
developing countries receive a larger portion if not all of global environment aid allocations.
Why is this the case? Does environment aid play a role in reducing emissions in developing
countries? Through the relocation of firms from foreign developed countries, developing
countries may benefit by acquiring superior technology. These new technologies can then be
employed in the manufacturing sectors. One interest is to know the extent to which these
diffused technologies help in reducing pollution or emissions in developing countries. Thus,
the third essay studies emissions in developing countries as they engage in international trade
with developed countries. Two key concepts here are the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH)
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and the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Environmental quality can be considered a
normal good so that developed countries have more stringent environmental regulations
than in developing countries. The PHH suggests that pollution intensive industries in a
bid to avoid exorbitant emission taxes or costs associated with adhering to these stringent
environmental regulations will migrate to developing countries where this costs are not as
high. This essay explores the effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on emissions in
developing countries.
The EKC explains the relationship between environmental degradation and development and suggest an inverted u-shaped between the two. Even though developed countries
are more industrialized and emit more Green House Gases than developing countries, developing countries still receive a substantial disbursement of environmental aid from developed
countries. As a result, this essay also explores the role environmental aid plays in reducing
emissions in developing countries.
Developing countries may also benefit from diffusion of cleaner technology as foreign
firms migrate from developed countries to the developing ones. As such, the essay also
investigates the effects of technology diffusion on carbon dioxide and total Green House Gas
emissions in developing countries and also assesses the extent to which technique effects help
developing countries to move away from pollution intensive methods of production.
In this essay, I recognize that FDI affect emissions in developing countries at the same
time, emission through the PHH affect FDI inflows. I therefore treat FDIs as endogenous
in my empirical analysis of emissions in developing countries. The analysis employs a panel
dataset and a fixed effects model.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the study on
the relationship between corruption and economic development. Subsequently, the analysis
on merchandise and service trade can be found in Chapter 3. The study of environmental
degradation in developing countries as they open up to trade is presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 draws the curtain on this dissertation by presenting the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
CORRUPTION AND GROWTH

2.1

Abstract
This chapter studies the path of corruption at various development stages. In particu-

lar, using a neoclassical growth model, I provide a theoretical framework to study corruption
level at various stages of development. I derive a testable proposition that corruption and
income have an inverted u-shaped relationship. I then apply the theory to a panel data of
75 countries during 2001-2008. After controlling for other related variables such as government expenditures, trade openness, etc., our empirical results indeed support our theory by
suggesting an inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income.
2.2

Introduction
The issue of corruption has gained much attention over the last few years. Countries

such as Uganda, Hong Kong, and Singapore have set up anti-corruption institutions in
an effort to combat corruption. A lot of nongovernmental agencies such as Transparency
International have sprung up in a bid to provide assessments of corruption in countries and
to raise awareness on the subject.
Corruption has however existed since time immemorial and different cultures and laws
have different takes on what corruption is. One thing is for sure though, most societies
frown upon it. Tanzi (1998) explains that a book titled Arthashastra on corruption may
have been written two thousand years ago. Whereas “lobbying” in order to gain certain
advantages (normally economic and political) may be generally accepted in the west, other
nations disapprove of it. Even though this phenomenon has existed for a while the views
on what corruption is and how to curtail it are varied and debates on it still rage on. Some
take a moral perspective and advocate for values and ethics as a viable means of solving
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it. Others have suggested the need for the establishment of incentives as well as punitive
measures; see Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999).
Corruption is hard to define; the complexity of the subject ensures that its definitions
varies and not all of them fully capture its intricacies. Corruption is generally accepted
as dishonesty however, different authors have put forth varied definitions of corruption.
Huntington (1968) defines corruption as “behavior of public officials which deviates from
accepted norms in order to serve private ends.” van Duyne (2001) also defines corruption as
“an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker consents
or deviates or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or her decisionmaking, in exchange for a reward or for the promise or expectation of a reward, while these
motives influencing his or her decision-making cannot be part of the justification of the
decision.” In the strictest sense, corruption does not only pertain to government officials or
the bureaucratic or political scenes. Any agent in an economy can perform corrupt acts.
Corruption has consequences that may stunt economic growth in countries. Mauro
(1997) explains that corruption may lead to a misallocation of talent in situation where
rent seeking is considered more beneficial than productive work. Corruption may also lead
to a loss in tax revenue for the government if firms and businesses engage in tax evasions.
Massive corruption could lead to political instability. In the past, public upheavals due to
corrupt government leaders have led to the overthrowing of governments. Where contractors
pay bribes in order to be awarded contracts this may lead to lower quality of infrastructure.
Excessive corruption may reduce the flow of foreign direct investments into a country. RoseAckerman (1997) explains that corruption may lead to inequities. Corrupt bidders with
inside connections are more likely to be awarded contracts than honest bidders. This has
negative effects on the distribution of wealth and resources.
Some literature (for example, Mauro, 1997) suggest that trade restrictions may induce
corrupt behavior. Indigenous producers and businessmen, in a bid to protect their businesses from foreign competition may lobby or bribe governments officials to impose tariffs
on imports which may create a semi-monopoly for the indigenous firms.
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Other works such as Hall (1976), Hofstede (1980), Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961),
and Ronen and Shenkar (1985) study how differences in culture affect people’s perspective
on corruption. Differences in culture may impact how different societies view competition,
material wealth, fairness, and attitudes towards change (Sanyal and Samanta, 2002). This is
also confirmed by Tsalikis and Nwachukwu (1991); they found that American and Nigerian
students’ views on corruption were influenced by their respective cultures.
Other factors such as price controls, low wages in the public sector, taxes, and regulations may affect corruption levels in a country (see Besley and McLaren, 1993 and Mauro,
1997).
Even though corruption may be generally frowned upon and discouraged, some authors
(for example, Cheung, 1996) explain that in instances where government policy fails to
efficiently allocate resources in an economy, corruption may ensure Pareto efficient levels are
reached. Houston (2007) also argues that corruption can lead to an expansion in economic
activity. He explains that inhabitants may result to bribing officials in order to evade bad
laws. His study shows that even though corruption may restrict a country’s development,
it also has expansionary effects.
This chapter develops a model to depict how society may approach corruption at different phases of development. I use a neoclassical growth model in which corruption is treated
as a public bad since corruption is frowned upon in most cultures. However, corruption
is considered as an input in the production process and thus incorporates the notion that
corruption facilitates the production process. In the model, it is assumed that the capital
stock follows the general law of motion. Income, in this model is allocated to consumption,
investment, and fighting corruption which can be viewed as a public good. The level of
corruption in any period thus depends on the stock of capital as well as anti-corruption
effort. The theory suggests that corruption is increasing in income at lower income levels
and decreasing in income at higher levels of income, alluding to an inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income. This is analogous to the Kuznets curve that draws
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a relationship between income and inequality.1 The economic intuition is that, at lower
income levels a society may be more concerned with putting bread on the table rather that
in anti-corruption but as income levels increase society becomes more interested in fighting
corruption. Another explanation is that, at lower levels of income or development, there
exist weak monitoring institutions as well as bureaucracies that promote the market for corruption thus as income increases, corruption increases as well. However, at higher levels of
income or development characterized by improved monitoring systems and anti-corruption,
this increase in income will reduce corruption supply.
This chapter also adds an empirical side that tests and establishes the existence of the
inverted u-shaped relationship. It employs a panel dataset on 75 countries covering the
period 2001-2008 and a two-way fixed effects model and demonstrates that factors such as
government fiscal policy (government expenditure), socioeconomic conditions, trade, as well
as war play vital roles in determining the level of corruption in a country.
2.3

Literature Review
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) use a principal agent model in examining corruption.Their

model discusses the relationship between the principal who could be a top level government
official and the agent who may well be an official. The official may accept bribes from
individuals interested in acquiring a good produced solely by the government. They discuss
ways to incentivize the official to be honest and not accept bribes. They provide a model
whereby the official presides over the sale of this good. They assume that the good is
homogeneous and that there exists a demand for this good by private agents. The official
may restrict the supply of the good or deny a private agent the right to acquire the good.
The official may do this without the risk of being found out or being punished. Shleifer and
Vishny (1993) assume that this could be because top officials get a cut or portion of the bribes
the official receives from selling this good to private agents. They provide two scenarios in
determining the marginal cost of the official. If the government produces this good at a fixed
1

The idea of the Kuznets curve has also been applied to environmental degradation and developed into a
significant branch in environmental economics. For example see, Forster (1973) and Selden and Song (1995),
among others.
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cost “p”, then depending on whether theft is possible or not the official sets his marginal
cost. In the event that price discrimination and theft is not possible, the marginal cost of
the official is the government’s cost of producing the good. The official would then charge a
higher price, keep the bribe then return the cost of producing the good to the government.
In the case where theft is possible the official has a marginal cost of zero and can charge lower
prices for the goods. In their paper, they discuss ways in which the risk of getting caught,
the number of people who purchase the goods, and the severity of the penalties affect an
official’s decision to be corrupt. They conclude that, central governments’ weaknesses may
be a possible reason why government agencies impose bribes on private agents requiring
permits and licenses. They also mention that corruption is often shrouded in secrecy which
might create distortions that discourage investments and growth. A host of papers (see for
example, Becker and Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; and Klitgaard, 1988) also provide
more analyses on corruption using a principal agent models.
There are other models aside from the principal agents model for studying corruption.
Faith (1980), Katz and Rosenberg (1989), and Kaufmann and Wei (1999) use resource
allocation models (rent-seeking behaviors) to study corruption.
Another seminal work that explores numerous aspects of corruption is presented in Tanzi
(1998). He cites the end of the cold war, a lack of information, an increase in the number of
democratic government, globalization, increased roles for nongovernmental agencies, greater
reliance on the market, and the United States roles as reasons why corruption has gained
much attention in recent years. He also explains that growth in international trade and
business as well as economic changes in countries have impacted corruption. He provides
a simple definition of corruption. Corruption is the “abuse of public power for private
benefit.” This definition may however be too simple to capture all the facets of corruption.
He cautions that corruption may not always involve the payment of bribes. Among the
factors that promote corruption, he mentions taxes, regulations and authorizations, and
spending decisions. Public sector wages may also be a key factor in combating corruption.
He explains that at lower levels of income, corruption tends to be high and at higher levels
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of income, corruption tends to be lower. Most penalty systems for corruption tend to be
inefficient and quite lenient. When corruption is politically motivated it becomes more
difficult to effectively apply penalties. Judges may be biased themselves due to familiarity
that may exist between them and the culprits. To effectively control corruption there must
be leadership by example, transparency, and institutional controls.
On the empirical side, there are a few papers that explore and establish some relationships between corruption and a number of factors. For example, Larraín et al. (2000) analyze
the effects of a country’s level of openness on its level of corruption. They use foreign direct
investment inflows, imports, and export as a percentage of GDP as indicators of a country’s
openness. They use corruption data from the International Country Risk Guide indicator.
The data cover the years 1982 to 1995. Their results indicate that import intensity is not
only associated with lower levels of corruption but may also reduce corruption. Their results also suggest that foreign direct investment and corruption have a negative relationship.
Treisman (2000) also conducts an empirical assessment of the effects on corruption from historical and cultural traditions, political institutions, levels of economic development, and
government policies. He uses data from 1980 to 1990 and compares different indexes of perceived corruption. Treisman finds that countries with protestant traditions and those with
histories of British rule tend to be less corrupt. He also finds that federal states are more
corrupt and countries with longer years of democracy, as well as those with more developed
economies tend to have lower levels of corruption.
Some literature, such as Mo (2001) analyzes the effects of corruption on the economic
growth of a country. Mo (2001) presents the following transmission channels: investment
channel, human capital channel, and political stability channel through which corruption
affects economic growth. Per his results, the direct impact, human capita, political stability, and investment channels make up for 11.8%, 14.8%, 53%, and 21.4% of the effect of
corruption on economic growth, respectively.
This chapter contributes to the literature on corruption and development by exploring
both theoretically and empirically the issue of corruption at different stages of income growth
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and development.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.4 provides the theoretical
framework and analysis. The empirical work is presented in section 2.5. Section 2.6 is
allocated to the concluding remarks.
2.4

The Model
In developing a relationship between corruption and economic development or growth,

I make use of a neoclassical growth framework where corruption is considered a public bad
in the utility function.2 For simplicity and effective analyses, I ignore labor as an input
and assume that the production process in this economy uses corruption and capital as
inputs.3 The neoclassical production function which is dependent on both capital (K) and
corruption (R) is given by F = F (K, R) where FK > 0, FR > 0, FKK < 0, and FRR <
0 with neoclassical justification.4 In adddition, the Inada conditions for the production
function must also be satisfied with limK→∞ FK = 0 and limK→0 FK = ∞. This production
structure is based on the earlier stated notion that corruption helps producers circumvent
bureaucracies and policies that lead to production inefficiencies.
I assume that the level of corruption at a point in time is a function of capital and anticorruption activities in the economy. Thus, R(t) = R(K(t), A(t)) where R and A denote
the level of corruption and anti-corruption activities, respectively. Let us assume RA < 0,
RAA = 0, RK > 0, and RKK < 0 which implies that capital corrupts but does so at a
decreasing rate. Inada conditions are imposed so that limK→0 RK = ∞ and limK→∞ RK =
0.5
In this economy, income is allocated towards consumption, investment in new capital
stock or anti-corruption activities. That is, F (K, R) = C + I + A, where C and I denote
2

This is similar to Forster (1973) where pollution is incorporated into the neoclassical growth model.
One can view labor as an input with constant endowment of labor so that all other inputs can be
viewed in terms of per unit of labor.
4
Subscripts denote partial derivatives throughout this chapter
5
An example of corruption function that satisfies these assumption is R(t) = K(t)β −A where 0 < β < 1.
In this very simple case corruption reduction technology (that is, the second term in R) is Ricardian with a
unity coefficient.
3
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consumption and investment respectively. Assuming that δ represents depreciation rate, the
evolution of capital over time is explained by K̇ = I − δK.
The utility function of this economy is given as U (C, R) with the standard assumptions
that UC > 0 UR < 0, UCC < 0, and URR < 0. Meaning, the marginal utility of consumption increases at a decreasing rate whilst the marginal utility of corruption decreases at a
decreasing rate. It is assumed further that the Inada conditions hold for consumption. This
then implies that its marginal utility is at its highest when corruption approaches zero.6
That is, limR→0 UR = 0.
The objective is to find a level of consumption and anti-corruption (thus, investment
level) that maximizes the present value of utility. The planner’s problem is given as
Z
max
C,A

∞

e−ρt U (C, R)dt

0

such that :
K̇ = I − δK
R = R(K, A)
F (K, R) = C + I + A
The Hamiltonian for this problem is given as:
H = u(C, R(K, A)) + π(F (K, R) − δK − C − A)
where π is the co-state variable also known as the shadow price of capital. The optimal
trajectories for K, C and A must satisfy the following first order conditions:
(2.1)

∂H
= UC − π = 0 ⇒ π = UC
∂C

(2.2)

∂H
UR RA
= UR RA + π(FR RA − 1) = 0 ⇒ π =
∂A
1 − FR RA

6
A simple example of for this utility function is U = (C θ − 1)/(1 − θ) − R2 /2, θ(0, 1) where the first
term is the commonly used constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function of consumption
and the second term is a quadratic corruption disutility function.
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(2.3)

π̇ = −

∂H
+ ρπ = −(UR RK + πFK + πFR RK − δπ) + ρπ
∂K

By combining equations (2.2) and (2.3) and substituting in the time derivative of equation
(2.1) I obtain:
(2.4)

Ċ =

RK
UC
(ρ + δ −
− FK )
UCC
RA

Equation (2.4) is known as the consumer Euler equation.7 From equations (2.1) and (2.2)
we see that:
(2.5)

UC (1 − FR RA ) − UR RA = 0

Equations (2.2) and (2.5) imply that UC = uR RA /(1 − FR RA ) = π. My assumptions
imply that 1 − FR RA > 0. These equalities imply that the marginal benefit of consumption
should equal the marginal gain from anti-corruption (after accounting for the effects of anticorruption activities on production) which in turn equals the shadow price of capital. One
should also notice that equation (2.5) defines the equilibrium level of corruption activities
(A) implicitly as function of consumption and capital, that is, A = A(C, K) with
and

∂A
∂K

∂A
∂C

>0

> 0.8 By substituting the equilibrium level of anti-corruption activities in the law

of motion for capital, we obtain:
K̇ = F (K, R) − C − A(C, K) − δK
let:
(2.6)

Φ(C, K) = F (K, R) − C − A(C, K) − δK

C
To see this one has to note that UUCC
= −C
where σ is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal
σ
substitution.
8
A proof of this and a formal derivation of all equations can be found in the appendix 2.A.

7
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Setting equation (2.6) equal to zero and totally differentiating it with respect to C and K,
yields:
 ∂A

FK + FR RK − ∂K
(1 − FR RA ) + δ
dC
ΦK
=
=−
dK
ΦC
(1 + AC − FR RA AC )

(2.7)

From equation (2.7), since the denominator is positive, the sign of

dC
dK

rests ultimately on

the sign of the numerator. Using the Inada conditions imposed on F and R we notice that
there exist a K ∗ such that for K < K ∗ the numerator is positive and the reverse holds where
K > K ∗ . This implies that:
dC
>
<
= 0 for K K ∗
dK
<
>
That is, along the curve K̇ ≡ Φ(C, K) = 0, C and K are positively related for low levels of
K but this relationship is negative for sufficiently high K. From equation (2.4) we obtain
an equation of motion for consumption. I set Ċ = 0 and define:
Ψ(K, C) = ρ + δ −

RK
− FK
RA

RA
The derivative of Ψ with respect to K (ΨK ) is −( RKK
+ FKK ).9 The model assumptions
R2
A

also imply that ΨC is zero and hence

dC
dK

=

K
−Ψ
ΨC

= ∞. Figure 1 depicts the loci for which

K̇ = 0 and Ċ = 0.
Next, note that Φ(K, C) is a decreasing function of C so for a fixed K and consumption
levels below the locus Φ(K, C) = 0, K̇ is positive whereas above it the reverse is true. Also,
since ΨK =

dĊ
dK

< 0, then to the right of the locus Ċ = 0, consumption growth will be

negative whereas to its left consumption growth will be positive. S represents the dynamic
adjustment(saddle) path which satisfies all conditions(constraints) in the model.
We can find a level of anti-corruption A(K, C) that solves equation (2.5) for any given
level of C and K. We assume a minimum level of anti-corruption activity α, this is because
even in the most corrupt societies there is always an opposition to corruption. Also no
country or society can function without a justice system or law enforcement. If UC >

UR R A
1−FR RA

at an initial point where C = Co , K = Ko , and A = α > 0, then the utility desired from
9

2
I assume that that RKK RA /RA
+ FKK > 0, that is, ΨK < 0, to ensure stability of steady-state
equilibrium.
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consumption outweighs the benefits a representative agent believes he/she will gain from
anti-corruption activities or from being fair. In such an instance we can find a set of different
combinations of consumption and capital such that anti-corruption activities would be at
its possible minimum, that is, A(K, C) = α. The frontier/boundary of this set satisfies:
γ = UC (1 − FR (R(K, R))

∂R(K, α)
∂R(K, α)
) − UR (R(K, α))
=0
∂A
∂A

Below this frontier lies a region where society remains indifferent to corruption reduction at
different combinations of C and K. Differentiating this equation with respect to C and K
yields:
(2.8)

∂R(K,α)
∂R(K,α)
−UC FRR ∂R(K,α)
− URR ∂R(K,α)
γK
dc
∂K
∂A
∂K
∂A
=−
=−
<0
dk
γC
UCC (1 − FR (R(K, α)) ∂R(K,α)
∂A

which implies that the frontier for A(K, C) = α has a negative slope in the C-K space. This
curve is denoted by A(K, C) in Figure 2.E.1. Then, as it can be seen from Figure 2.E.1,
for K ∈ [K0 , K A ] corruption reduction activities will remain at the minimum possible level
(α), implying that Ȧ = 0. This is because the range lies within the zone of indifference
to corruption reduction. For K ∈ [K A , K̄], in order to determine the behavior of Ȧ we
differentiate equation (2.5) with respect to t to obtain:
(2.9)

Ȧ =

UCC Ċ(1 − FR RA ) − K̇(UC RA FRR RK + URR RA RK )
>0
2F
2
UC RA
RR + URR RA

When we take the time derivative of the corruption reduction function, we get Ṙ =
RK K̇ + RA Ȧ. In the range K ∈ [K0 , K A ], Ȧ = 0 implying that Ṙ = RK K̇ > 0 and hence
corruption would increase as agents express an indifference to corruption. For the range
K ∈ [K A , K̄] however, equation (2.9) would imply:
(2.10)

Ṙ =

UCC RA (1 − FR RA )Ċ
2F
2
UC R A
RR + URR RA
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The numerator in equation (2.10) is positive whilst the denominator is negative hence overall
Ṙ < 0. This implies that
Ṙ =



 >0

 <0

2.5



for K ∈ Ko , K A


for K ∈ K A , K̄

Empirical Analyses

2.5.1

Data

For the empirical analysis of the above model, I consider 75 countries (see Table 2.E.1
for the list of countries) over a period of eight years, 2001 to 2008 implying a total of 600
observations per variable. The countries represented in this analysis include developing,
middle income, as well as high income countries. Table 2.E.2 presents a summary of key
variable statistics used in the analysis.
Data on the corruption comes from the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG)
political risk ratings data set. The corruption rating reflects the extent of corruption in a
country’s political system. It takes into account forms of corruption faced by businesses such
as bribes associated with imports, loans, and export licenses. This rating is more concerned
with other forms of corruption such as nepotism and job reservations. For more information
and technicalities on this rating see Howell (1998) as well as Howell (2011). Corruption’s
original rating was scored over 6 points with a higher score denoting less corruptibility and
vice versa. This rating is thus rescaled to percentage points by dividing by 6, subtracting
from 1, then multiplying by 100 i.e. (new corruption index=(1-corruption/6)*100). This
transformation also ensures that high percentage scores imply higher levels of corruption.
GDP data comes from the World Bank database. The GDP data aggregates all gross
value added in the economy by resident producers, as well as taxes, net of any subsidies not
captured in the products value. The data values are expressed in current US dollars
Data on rent, military expenditure, and government expenditure also come from the
World Bank database. Rent signifies total natural resource rent and is defined as the sum of
rents from natural gas, oil, coal, forests, and minerals, expressed as a percentage of domes-
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tic GDP. Government expenditure represents general government final consumption and it
captures all current government expenditures on goods and services as well as expenses on
defense and security. They are also expressed as a percentage of Total GDP. Military Expenditure is expressed as a percentage of GDP and it encompasses a country’s expenses, both
current and capital on its armed forces, peace keeping forces, paramilitary etc and includes
expenses on pensions for military retirees, procurement, and operations and maintenance.
It is worth noting that government expenditure does not include military expenditures that
are part of government capital formation.
War data comes from the PRIO Conflict Site dataset. This dataset is an extension of the
PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset; it includes coordinates for conflict zones and the countries
in which these zones are located. For the purposes of this research the data is modified
by creating a dummy variable (with values zero and one) to correspond to any incident of
conflict in a country within the time frame of the research. One denotes a recorded conflict
and zero otherwise. See Hallberg (2012) for more information on the conflict dataset.
The data on socio-economic conditions also comes from ICRG’s political risk ratings
dataset. This risk rating is comprised of the following subcomponents: unemployment,
consumer choice, and poverty. It assesses the socio-economic pressures in a country and how
these pressures may induce social unrest and dissatisfaction, as well as reduce a government’s
effectiveness. The ratings are scored over 12 but are rescaled to percentages. Higher values
connote very low risk hence good and favorable socio-economic pressures and vice versa.
Data on imports and exports as a percentage of GDP came World Bank database. They
capture such exchanges related to merchandise, freight, transportation, construction, and
royalties to and from the rest of the world. A measure of trade openness is calculated from
this two variables using the formula:
Trade Openness =
2.5.2

Imports+Exports
GDP

Empirical Model

To empirically test the theoretical model proposed, I use a fixed effects model with
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time effects with panel data. Fixed effects help to reduce any potential bias resulting from
omitted variables. By using Panel data, the researcher has the advantage of using both cross
sectional and time series information in analyzing empirical relationship. It also increases the
number of observations, implying increased degrees of freedom and reduces any collinearity
among the explanatory variables (Hurlin and Venet (2001)). The model is given as:
(2.11)

yit = αi + Γt + β1 xit + β2 x2it + γZ + Uit

with i = 1, ........, N (number of countries) and t = 1, ........, T (number of time periods)
where αi and Γ represent country specific effects and a time effects respectively. The individual effects (αi ) picks up any country specific influences which do no vary with time.
Under the fixed effects model αi is assumed to be correlated with the regressors. The time
effects (Γ) control for certain phenomena that vary with time but common to all countries.
Also, x and y represent income, in this case log of GDP and corruption respectively. Z
represents all other control variables used in the empirical analysis. These control variables
include war (internal conflict), socio-economic conditions, rent, military expenditure, and
government expenditure. Uit is the error term.
In the model section, it was shown that under certain assumptions and conditions the
corruption and income can have an inverted u-shaped relationship. The signs of β1 and β2
are important in ascertaining the possible existence of this relationship. Possible scenario
for the signs of β1 and β2 include:
1. If β1 = β2 = 0, then in this case, no relationship exists between corruption and income.
>
2. If β1
0 and β2 = 0 then as income increases, the level of corruption in a country
< 

increases
monotonically.
decreases
3. if β1 < 0 and β2 > 0, then there exists a u-shaped relationship between corruption
levels and income.
4. if β1 > 0 and β2 < 0, then the possibility of an inverted u-shaped relationship between
corruption and income is validated.
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In the case of socio-economic conditions, one would expect that with worsening socioeconomic conditions (that is, a decrease in the index) corruption would increase. This
is because bad socio-economic conditions are often associated with poverty, a deprivation of
basic social amenities, and scarcity often induce corruption in a society (UN-Habitat and
Transparency International, 2004). Thus, socioeconomic conditions and corruption level
should have an inverse relationship.
The relationship between resource rents and corruption can be rather inconclusive.
Some authors (see, for example, Treisman, 2000) argue that rents might induce corruption
when it comes to their distribution. Ades and Di Tella (1999) assert that where countries
have large resource endowments, officials have a higher tendency to be corrupt. On the
contrary, one could also argue that if owners of resources receive higher and fairer rents,
there would be a lesser propensity to be corrupt.
I use military expenditure as a proxy for law enforcement effectiveness. The expectation
is that as law enforcement effectiveness increase (efficient monitoring institutions, as well
as better renumeration for the police forces and the judiciary), then there should be less
incentive for officials to be corrupt. Also, society would be deterred if they are scared
monitoring institutions will be up on their corrupt activities. Tanzi (1998) explains the
importance of increasing penalties in decreasing corruption. However, he cautions that
higher punitive measures may increase demands for higher bribes.
From real life cases, war-torn countries are often associated with high incidences of
corruption. This is because in the event of a war, most institutions breakdown, and law
enforcement tends to be ineffective. Thus, people see this as an opportunity to amass
wealth by taking advantage of broken down system. I would therefore expect a direct relationship between war and corruption. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) (Transparency International, 2010), which ranks countries by perceived levels
of corruption in the public sector, shows that, war-torn, fragile and unstable countries like
Somalia, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sudan, and Iraq have the highest levels of corruption.
The sign of coefficient on government expenditure is inconclusive. One may expect that
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as governments spend more on social infrastructure and amenities, education, and health,
corruption would fall. This should be the case if such spendings help reduce public upheavals
and any societal agitations. Lindbeck (1998) suggests that low levels of corruption in Sweden
may be partly attributed to high-level administrators earning roughly 12 to 15 times more
in wages than the average factory worker. At the same time, Tanzi (1998) mentions that
officials may find government spending on projects as an avenue to embezzle funds, in which
case increased government expenditure may induce corrupt activities in officials.
A country’s level of trade openness should have a direct effect on its corruption levels.
The reason being that, trade restrictions often come in the form of higher tariffs, quotas,
and import/export licenses; these inhibit the activities of importers and exporters. Mauro
(1997) explains that local manufacturers in a bid to protect their business may lobby for the
maintenance and establishment of import barriers by bribing corrupt officials. One should
thus expect that if trade openness increases, corruption should decrease.
Another issue worth noting about equation 2.11 is the endogeneity of income in the
model. The level of corruption and income levels are jointly determined in the model. This
is because people’s decision to either invest, consume or engage in anti-corruption activities
inadvertently affects income. This would mean that the square of income is also endogenous.
To get round this, I employ instrumental variables. For income, I use its lagged value as an
instrument. I also use the lagged values of its square as instrument for the square of income.
As Angrist and Pischke (2008) explain, by doing this, I do not commit the “forbidden
regression.” The instrumentation process is valid since it is exactly identified and lagged
values are correlated with the endogenous regressors and theoretically sound.
As stated earlier, panel data comprises of both cross-sectional data and time series.
This means that, in using panel data we have to ensure that the following phenomena are
accounted or corrected for:
Cross-Sectional Dependence: Cross-sectional dependence arises when some of crosssectional units (countries) are interdependent on each other. Using time dummies in a model
can help in controlling for some forms of cross-sectional dependence so this should not be
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much of a problem in this model since its a two way fixed effects model. Baltagi (2008)
explains that cross-sectional dependence is much of a concern in macro panels with long
time series but no so much in micro panels.
Stationarity: A weak stationary process would have the constant mean, variance,
and auto-covariance. This implies that, a stationary process has a higher tendency to
converge towards the mean. The use of a non-stationary process in a regression can produce
misleading result; regressions may show significant relationships when in actual fact there
might not be any. This is explained in Granger and Newbold (1974). When a series or
process is non-stationary its order of integration must be determined by differencing till it
becomes stationary.
Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation: One fundamental assumption in equation 2.11 is the assumption that disturbances are homoskedastic. This means that they have
the same variance across time and cross-sections. When this is violated, regressions may
produce consistent but inefficient estimates. Serial correlation could also lead to inefficient
but consistent estimates if it is ignored. Serial correlation is however not an issue in micro
panels.
2.5.3

Empirical Results

In testing for cross-sectional independence in the equation 2.11, I use the method explained in Pesaran (2004). This method has the advantage of being robust to the presence
of unit roots and structural breaks. Additionally, it is favored for its ability to handle both
unbalanced and balanced panels with small T and large N. The test reveals that there is no
cross-sectional dependence in the model.
I use a modified Wald statistics described in (Greene, 2003, p 598) in testing for heteskedasticitity in the model. The test reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity. Thus, for
the estimation process, I use robust standard errors.
For the panel unit root test, I employ Choi (2001) P and Pm test statistics.10 The
advantage of this test as Choi (2001) points out is that each panel can have a different
10

This was originally developed by Fisher (1932).
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stochastic and non-stochastic components, as well as different time series dimensions, i.e., it
works well for both balanced and unbalanced panels. The test shows that all variables except
"war" are stationary. The war variable is a dummy variable and as such its stationarity does
not pose a problem for the analysis.11
I employ Schaffer (2012) module in the estimation process.12 The results for the estimation of equation 2.11 is presented in Table 2.E.4. The first model estimates equation 2.11
without considering time effects whilst the second model does. The results show that the
log of GDP which measures average income is very significant in both models. It has the
appropriate positive sign. This implies that holding all else constant and for this particular
sample of countries, a percentage increase in GDP will result in 0.6228 unit increase in corruption on the average.13 This value does not change much in the second model when time
effects are controlled for.
The coefficient of the squared log of GDP is also very significant and has the expected
sign. This, as well as the positive and significant coefficient of the log of GDP validate
the possibility of an inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income. This
suggests that a higher income level leads to higher corruption at low levels of income, but the
converse is true at high levels of income. My model explains that at lower levels of income,
people care very little about contributing to anti-corruption. They are more interested in
diverting their resources towards consumption, and investment in capital but as income
increases, anti-corruption mechanisms become more affordable.
The results also indicate a negative coefficient for government spending. It is significant
at the 10% level. This implies that corruption decreases with government spending. This
further buttresses the view that as government spends more on public sector wages, social
infrastructure and amenities, as well as strengthening the judiciary, and law enforcement
agencies, then corruption should reduce. The argument that increases in government expenditure may provide avenues for public officials to be corrupt, may not necessarily hold true
if monitoring activities of the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary are strengthened.
11

All the tests are presented in the appendix section of this paper.
For the first stage estimation results see Table 4..2.
13 62.28
= unit∆Corruption
100
%∆GDP
12
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Government fiscal policy may thus play an important role in reducing corruption provided
there is accountability and transparency (see Kopits et al., 1998).
From Table 2.E.4, one can see that the coefficient for military expenditure has a positive
sign. This goes contrary to what was expected. Military expenditure is used as a proxy for
law enforcement expenditure and effectiveness. One would expect that as law enforcement
expenditure and effectiveness increases, corruption should reduce. Some literature argue that
law enforcement effectiveness may not necessarily lead to a decline in corruption but could
rather cause people do seek higher compensations for their corrupt activities. Criminals
may also increase their level of sophistication to counter the increased effectiveness of law
enforcement. These could explain the positive relationship between corruption and law
enforcement expenditure. In any case, this relationship is not significant in this model.
The estimations also show that rents are very significant. The coefficients bear a negative sign. This implies that as the proportion of rents in the GDP goes up, corruption
declines. This can be interpreted in two ways: the first may be that as the prices of natural
resources, and rents to owners increase (the proportion of rents in GDP increases), there
may be less incentive for natural resource owners to engage in illicit activities provided law
enforcement monitoring activities remain effective. The second could be that the percentage of rents in GDP has increased because of increased mining and exploitation of natural
resources. This would mean more jobs, implying increased wages, which in turn reduce any
forms of public upheavals and reduce incidences of corruption in the economy.
Table 2.E.4 also confirms a priori expectations about incidences of war and their effects
on corruption levels. The coefficient of war has a positive sign and it is very significant.
According to the estimates, holding all other things constant, an incidence of conflict, any
ethnic tensions or war would increase a country’s corruption index by 8.3 units. When wars
occur, there is normally a breakdown of institutions which often means that monitoring
system are weak or almost inexistent. This could possibly explain why war-torn countries
like Iraq and Afghanistan are relatively more corrupt than other more politically stable
countries.
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The estimation results also indicate that socioeconomic conditions are significant in
the model. Its coefficient also has a negative sign. This implies that as the socioeconomic
conditions in a country improve so that schools, hospitals, and other basic social amenities
are provided, coupled with improved governance, democracy and judicial transparency, then
one would expect that inhabitants of a country will be less likely to engage in corruption.
For trade the estimation results suggest that when a country opens up to trade, corruption declines. This is so because the coefficient has a negative sign and it is significant at the
10% level. This means that holding all other things constant, an increase in trade openness
(import and export intensities) lead to a 0.04 point decline in the corruption index. This
finding concurs with findings in Larraín et al. (2000) where they find that a one standard
deviation increase in import intensity causes a 0.3 point reduction in the corruption index.
Ades and Di Tella (1999) also find that openness may lead to less competition.
2.6

Conclusion
This research focuses on corruption as economies move through different phases of devel-

opment. It presents a possible way in which society makes decisions pertaining to corruption.
I use a neoclassical growth model to show that at low levels of income, individuals allocate
their income towards consumption and investment and care less about anti-corruption activities. The model shows the possibility of an inverted u-shaped relationship between
corruption and income.
This paper also conducts empirical analyses to ascertain the possible existence of an
inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income. I use panel data on 75
countries covering a period of eight years from 2001 to 2008 and employ a two way fixed
effect model to establish and investigate empirical relationships.
The estimation results show that log of GDP has a positive and significant sign whilst
its square has a negative and significant coefficient. This thus confirms the existence of an
inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income and hence validates the afore
mentioned theoretical model.
This chapter also establishes that trade openness could possibly lead to a reduction in
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corruption. This lends support to similar findings in some literature about import intensities
and anti-corruption. I also establish the well accepted notion that an incidence of war, ethnic
tensions, and conflicts would lead to an increase in corruption in the stipulated countries.
The estimates show that such incidences increase the corruption index of a country by about
8.3 points.
Government expenditure is also significant in the empirical model. It shows that as government expenditure increases the level of corruption in a country reduces. This is contrary
to what has been suggested in some literature that increases in government expenditure
may provide more incentives for people to be corrupt. In this essay, military expenditure is
used as a proxy for law enforcement. The results show that this is not significant.The paper
also shows that as the proportion of natural resource rents in the GDP increases, corruption
decreases. It also establishes that socioeconomic conditions in a country is very important
in controlling corruption in a country.

References
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella, “Rents, Competition, and Corruption,” The American Economic Review 89 (1999), 982–993.
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke, Mostly Harmless Conometrics: An Empiricists’ Companion, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
Baltagi, B. H., Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Vol. 1, (Chichester, United Kingdom:
John Wiley & Sons, 2008).
Becker, G. S. and G. J. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation
of Enforcer,” The Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1974), 1–18.
Besley, T. and J. McLaren, “Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives,” The
Economic Journal 103 (1993), 119–141.
Cheung, S. N., “A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory of Corruption,” Contemporary
Economic Policy 14 (1996), 1–5.
Choi, I., “Unit Root Tests for Panel Data,” Journal of International Money and Finance
20 (2001), 249–272.

26
Faith, R. L., “Rent-Seeking Aspects of Bureaucratic Competition,” in J. M. Buchanan,
R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College
Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 332–343.
Forster, B. A., “Optimal Capital Accumulation in a Polluted Environment,” Southern
Economic Journal 39 (1973), 544–547.
Fisher, R. A., Statistical Methods for Research Workers, 4th edition (Edinburgh, Scotland:
Oliver and Boyd, 1932).
Granger, C. W. and P. Newbold, “Spurious Regressions in Econometrics,” Journal of
Econometrics 2 (1974), 111–120.
Greene, W. H., Econometric Analysis (India: Pearson Education, 2003).
Hall, E. T., Beyond Culture (New York, NY: Anchor Books, Vol. 222, 1976), p.13.
Hallberg, J. D., “Prio Conflict Site 1989–2008: A Geo-Referenced Dataset on Armed
Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (2012), 219–232.
Hofstede, G., Culture’s Consequences (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980).
Houston, D. A., “Can Corruption Ever Improve an Economy?,” Cato Journal 27 (2007),
325–342.
Howell, L. D., The Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis, 2nd edition (East
Syracuse, NY: PRS Group, 1998).
Howell, L. D., International Country Risk Guide Methodology (East Syracuse, NY: PRS
Group, 2011).
Huntington, S. P., “Modernization and Corruption,” In Political Corruption: A Handbook
(1968), 253–263.
Hurlin, C. and B. Venet, “Granger Causality Tests in Panel Data Models with Fixed
Coefficients,” Cahier de Recherche EURISCO, Université Paris IX Dauphine (September
2001).
Katz, E. and J. Rosenberg, “Rent-Seeking for Budgetary Allocation: Preliminary Results for 20 Countries,” Public Choice 60 (1989), 133–144.
Kaufmann, D., S.-J. Wei, “Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?,”
Tech. rep. (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999).

27
Klitgaard, R. E., Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1988).
Kluckhohn, F. R. and F. L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (New York,
NY: Row Peterson, 1961).
Kopits, G. and J. D. Craig, “Transparency in Government Operations,” Tech. Rep.,
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1998).
Larraín, F. and J. Tavares, “Can Openness Deter Corruption?”, Unpublished Working
Paper, Harvard University (2000). Available Online at
http://www.iseg.utl.pt/departamentos/economia/ecosemin/00_01/t2000-08.pdf.
Lindbeck, A., “Swedish Lessons for Post-Socialist Countries”, Tech. Rep., IUI Working
Paper (1998).
Mauro, P., “Why Worry About Corruption?,” Economic Issues 6 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997).
Mo, P. H., “Corruption and Economic Growth,” Journal of Comparative Economics 29
(2001), 66–79.
Pesaran, M. H., “General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels,” IZA
Discussion Paper No. 1240 (2004).
Ronen, S. and O. Shenkar, “Clustering Countries on Attitudinal Dimensions: A Review
and Synthesis,” Academy of Management Review 10 (1985), 435–454.
Rose-Ackerman, S., Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1978).
Rose-Ackerman, S., “The Political Economy of Corruption,” in K. A. Elliott, ed., Corruption and the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,
1997), 31–66.
Rose-Ackerman, S., Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform
(London, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Sanyal, R. N. and S. K. Samanta, “Corruption Across Countries: The Cultural and
Economic Factors,” Business & Professional Ethics Journal 21 (2002), 21–46.

28
Selden, T. M. and D. Song, “Neoclassical Growth, the J Curve for Abatement, and the
Inverted U Curve for Pollution,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
29 (1995), 162–168.
Schaffer, M. E., “xtivreg2: Stata Module to Perform Extended iv/2sls, gmm and ac/hac,
liml and k-Class Regression for Panel Data Models” (Statistical Software Components,
2012).
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, “Corruption,” NBER Working Papers 4372 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, May 1993).
http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/4372.html
Tanzi, V., “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures,” Staff
Papers 45 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1998), 559–594.
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (Germany: Transparency
International, 2010).
Treisman, D., “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public
Economics 76 (2000), 399–457.
Tsalikis, J. and O. Nwachukwu, “A Comparison of Nigerian to American Views of
Bribery and Extortion in International Commerce,” Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991),
85–98.
UN-Habitat and Transparency International, Tools to Support Transparency in
Local Governance, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Urban Governance
Toolkit Series (Nairobi: UN-Habitat, March 2004).
van Duyne, P. C., “Will Caligula Go Transparent? Corruption in Acts and Attitude,” in
Forum on Crime and Society Vol. 1 (2001), 73–98.

29
Appendices

2.A

Proof that

∂A
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>0

UC (1 − FR RA ) − UR RA = 0
D = UC (1 − FR RA ) − UR RA
−UC FRR RK RA − URR RK RA
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=−
=−
>0
2 −U
2
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DA
−UC FRR RA
RR RA
UCC (1 − FR RA )
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=−
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=−
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2.B

Test For Cross-sectional Dependence and Heteroskedasticity

Test for cross-sectional dependence
Pesaran’s test of cross sectional independence = −1.175,

Pr = 0.2401

Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements = 0.480

Test for heteroskedasticity
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model
H0 : σi2 = σi2

for all i

χ271 = 7907.60
Prob > χ271 = 0.0000
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2.C

Panel Unit Root Test
Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: At least one panel is stationary
Table 2.C.1: Panel Data Unit Root Test
Variables
P P-value
Pm
Log of GDP
Square log of GDP
Trade Openness
Government Expenditure
Military Expenditure
Rent
Corruption
Socio-economic Conditions
War

1137.527
1153.88
833.7115
223.5415
558.0388
304.1797
641.9233
613.9051
2.1775

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000

57.0149
57.9591
39.4741
4.2459
24.6874
8.9016
28.4012
26.7836
-8.5345

P-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
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2.D

Hausman Test
Table 2.D.1: Stored Regression Estimates for Hausman Test
Coefficients

Log of GDP
Square log of GDP
Government Expenditure
Military Expenditure
Rent
War
Socioeconomic Conditions
Trade Openness

(b)
fixed
62.28307
-1.23942
-0.49508
0.478037
-0.33328
8.293735
-0.17403
-0.04631

(B)
random
42.60741
-0.86726
-0.91811
0.775782
-0.11326
6.748923
-0.27406
-0.06846

(b-B)
Difference
19.67566
-0.37216
0.42303
-0.29774
-0.22002
1.544812
0.100028
0.022141

sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
S.E.
6.026778
0.122586
0.185061
0.823748
0.056768
0.824304
0.030625
0.024117

b = consistent under Ho and Ha
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic

χ28 = (b − B)0 [(Vb − VB )−1 ](b − B) = 34.48
Prob > χ28 = 0.0000
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2.E

Tables and Figures

Argentina
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia

Table 2.E.1: List of Countries
Denmark
Ireland
Nigeria
Ecuador
Israel
Norway
Egypt
Italy
Pakistan
El Salvador
Japan
Panama
Estonia
Jordan
Peru
Finland
Kazakhstan
Philippines
France
Kenya
Poland
Ghana
Latvia
Portugal
Greece
Lithuania
Romania
Guatemala Luxembourg
Russia
Honduras
Malawi
Senegal
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Singapore
Hungary
Mexico
Slovenia
Iceland
Namibia
South Africa
India
Netherlands
Spain
Indonesia
Nicaragua
Sweden

Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia
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Table 2.E.2: Summary Statistics for Variables
Variable Observations Mean Std.
Dev.
GDP
Government Expenditure
Military Expenditure
Rent
War
Corruption
Socioeconomic Conditions
Exports
Imports
Trade Openness

600
600
565
600
600
600
600
600
600
600

3.53E+11
15.69921
1.880184
6.807774
0.135
52.07945
53.06192
44.59458
45.78814
90.38272

7.13E+11
5.069147
1.247784
11.14173
0.342009
20.48455
20.63711
34.47649
30.62406
64.26983

Min

Max

1.72E+09
4.506118
0.371024
0
0
0
12.5
9.55879
8.480795
18.03959

4.85E+12
28.58926
9.636058
68.46915
1
91.66666
91.66666
230.269
209.3877
439.6567
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Variables

Table 2.E.3: First Stage Regression Results
(1)
(2)
(3)
Log of GDP Square log of GDP Log of GDP

Government Expenditure
Military Expenditure
Rent
War
Socioeconomic
Conditions
Trade Openness
year 2003

-0.00643
(0.00463)
-0.0653***
(0.0238)
0.00933***
(0.00172)
0.0332
(0.0223)

-0.342
(0.228)
-3.301***
(1.182)
0.458***
(0.0865)
1.517
(1.124)

-0.00614
(0.00411)
-0.0276
(0.0171)
0.00630***
(0.00157)
0.0263
(0.0288)

-0.330
(0.204)
-1.427*
(0.830)
0.309***
(0.0780)
1.132
(1.438)

0.00413**
(0.00186)
-0.000439
(0.000611)

0.215**
(0.0967)
-0.0236
(0.0298)

1.250***
(0.267)
-0.00616
(0.00542)

13.58
(13.06)
0.676**
(0.268)

0.00481***
(0.00150)
-0.00329***
(0.000793)
0.112***
(0.0208)
0.173***
(0.0308)
0.191***
(0.0445)
0.252***
(0.0561)
0.334***
(0.0654)
0.382***
(0.0837)
1.265***
(0.251)
-0.0126**
(0.00559)

0.249***
(0.0787)
-0.165***
(0.0398)
5.709***
(1.057)
8.732***
(1.591)
9.544***
(2.308)
12.50***
(2.905)
16.69***
(3.404)
19.04***
(4.354)
14.24
(12.30)
0.360
(0.280)

year 2004
year 2005
year 2006
year 2007
year 2008
lagged log of GDP
lagged square log of GDP
Observations
R-squared
Number of id

(4)
Square log of GDP

495
495
495
0.925
0.926
0.951
71
71
71
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

495
0.951
71
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Table 2.E.4: Estimation Results
(1)
(2)
Variables
Corruption Corruption
Log of GDP
Square Log of GDP
Government Expenditure
Military Expenditure
Rent
War
Socio-economic Conditions
Trade Openness
year 2003
year 2004
year 2005
year 2006
year 2007
year 2008

62.28***
(16.16)
-1.239***
(0.324)
-0.495*
(0.273)
0.478
(1.140)
-0.333***
(0.103)
8.294***
(2.892)
-0.174***
(0.0534)
-0.0463*
(0.0253)

62.48***
(16.09)
-1.242***
(0.333)
-0.455*
(0.275)
0.689
(1.158)
-0.344***
(0.105)
8.565***
(2.814)
-0.181***
(0.0569)
-0.0505*
(0.0284)
-1.403
(1.179)
0.0500
(1.353)
-0.156
(1.545)
0.279
(1.906)
-0.450
(2.422)
-0.615
(3.025)

Observations
495
495
R-squared
0.159
0.167
Number of id
71
71
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 3
TRADE IN MERCHANDISE AND SERVICES: A GRAVITY
APPROACH

3.1

Abstract
This chapter explores the determinants of merchandise and services trade both theoret-

ically and empirically using the gravity approach. It uses a general equilibrium framework
to show that merchandise and service trade may be simultaneously determined. Our empirical analysis indeed supports this proposition regarding the simultaneity of merchandise
and service trade.
3.2

Introduction
The gravity model as used in international trade is analogous to Newton’s law of gravity,

which purports that all objects attract each other with a force that is directly proportional
to their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance from their respective
centers. In economic terms, the gravity model may help explain trade flows between two
countries, as a function of their respective economic masses (often GDP), population, and
distances. That is, the trade flow from country i to country j, denoted by Xij , is directly
proportional to their respective incomes Yi and Yj and inversely proportional to the square
of the distance from their centers Dij . This is expressed as:
(3.1)

Xij =

Yi Yj
2
Dij

i 6= j

The gravity model has been adopted to solve a host of issues ranging from assessing
trip distribution (Voorhees, 1956) to studying migration (Ravenstein, 1885; Karemera et al.,
2000). However, Tinbergen (1962) was the first to use the gravity model in explaining
bilateral trade flows. Though the gravity equation may be said to draw analogies from the
traditional Newton law of gravity, seminal works such as Anderson (1979), Anderson and
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Van Wincoop (2001), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), and Eaton and
Kortum (2002) provide theoretical basis for the multiplicative form of the gravity model as
used in international trade.
The exponents on the mass variables and the bilateral distance in equation 3.1 as
defined by the traditional gravity model need not always be 1 and -2, respectively. As
Anderson (2010) explains, many applications have seen the estimated coefficients on the
mass variables and distance coefficient cluster to 1 and -1 respectively. Equation 3.1 can
thus be transformed into
β

(3.2)

Xij =

Yiβ1 Yj 2
β3
Dij

where β1 > 0, β2 > 0, and β3 > 0 as seen in Tinbergen (1962). The coefficients β1 and β2 can
be seen as country i’s own-income elasticity of exports and its export elasticity to country j’s
income, respectively. Equations 3.1 and 3.2 may be too simple in assuming that trade flows
from country i to country j are influenced only by their bilateral trade restrictions. Anderson
(2010) explains that trade from i to j is also influenced by the remoteness or restriction on
trade movements to i’s other possible trade partners or destinations as well as restriction on
trade movements from j’s alternative suppliers of imports (potential import origins). Some
P D
current literature have thus used remoteness indexes ( i Yiji ) as explanatory variables in
traditional gravity models. The distance or remoteness of a country is however not the
only form of resistance to trade. There could be various trade policies that could potentially
restrict or facilitate the flow of goods into or out of a country. How easily accessible a country
is, in terms of it being landlocked or it having a harbor may present significant or additional
trade cost to an exporter or importer (Limao and Venables, 2001). Differences in currency
between two countries may also present a significant barrier to trade; see Rose (2000).
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001) demonstrates that including "multilateral resistance" can
substantially improve the estimation of a gravity model and argue that distance measures do
not fully incorporate the effects of multilateral resistance. They advice that gravity models
should account for the effects of trade cost or barriers on prices. Feenstra (2004) shows that
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using fixed effects can solve the above problem of multilateral resistance raised by Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2001).
Berthelon and Freund (2008) also use disaggregated bilateral trade data to analyze the
effect of distance on trade. They find that the elasticity of trade with respect to distance
has increased by 10% since 1985. This would suggests that trade flows to and from remote
places have increased in spite of their distance. They show that changes in freight costs and
tariffs may lessen the effects of distance on trade.
Over the years, the success of the gravity model in economic empirical analysis has led to
a plethora literature attempting to validate its theoretical basis. Head et al. (2013) provides
three different variants of the gravity equations based on surveyed theoretical literature on
the subject. Others such as Anderson (2010), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006), as well as Bergstrand and Egger (2011) provide extensive analysis of
various theoretical derivation of the gravity model.
In spite of the abundance of literature on the theoretical justification and applications
of the gravity model, literature on its application to services is rather scanty. Francois
(1993) can be considered as one of the very first applications of the gravity model to trade
in services. He uses data on US producer services for the year 1986 to estimate his gravity
model. He finds that import and exports of services are positively related to the GDP per
capita, and the population of the trading partners. He also finds that having a common
language significantly increases exports.
Walsh (2006) uses a gravity model to evaluate the effects of barriers, and other factors on
trade in services. He extends previous literature on services trade by focusing on the following
four disaggregated services sectors: government, travel, transport, and other commercial
services. Walsh (2006) uses import data on 27 OECD countries and about 50 of their trading
partners and employs a Hausman-Taylor estimator in the empirical analysis. He finds that
common language, GDP per capita, and population of the importing country positively
influence the import of travel services. GDP per capita, population of both importer and
exporter, distance, adjacency, and EU membership are positively related to the import of
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transport services. For government services, he finds that only the GDP per capita of the
exporting country is significant. For all other commercial services not captured by the afore
mentioned categories, the GDP per capita of both the importer and exporter as well as
language have positive and significant coefficients.
Another application of the gravity model to trade in services is presented in Grünfeld
and Moxnes (2003). Grunfeld and Moxnes use the gravity model to explore the determinants
of international service trade and foreign affiliate. They employ data on 22 OECD countries
and use a trade restrictiveness index developed by the Australian Productivity Commission
as a measure of barriers to service trade and FDI. Their results indicate the presence of a
home market effect in the services trade. Their findings also confirm the widely accepted
view that trade barriers negatively affect trade. This negative effect is even more severe in
the case of foreign affiliate sales. They also show that a removal of trade barriers increases
trade by 50%.
Mirza and Nicoletti (2004) present another perspective on bilateral trade in services.
Their model is based on a framework initially developed by Kremer (1993). They also
employ data on bilateral trade in services for OECD countries. Their findings reveal that
labor cost and infrastructure in both the exporting and importing countries affect bilateral
trade in services interactively.
Schwellnus (2007) also use the gravity model and data from the Eurostat ITS database
in analyzing the effects of domestic regulations on services trade, for both cross-sectional
and panel data analysis. The result of their estimation lends support to literature that an
inverse and significant relationship exist between domestic regulations and services trade.
Kimura and Lee (2006) employ the gravity model to analyze and evaluate the determinants of bilateral service trade in comparison to the bilateral goods trade. In their analysis,
they employ data on services and goods trade on 10 OECD member countries and 47 member and nonmember trading partners. They find, by using R2 as measure of goodness of
fit that the gravity model performs better for the bilateral trade in services than for the
trade in goods. They interestingly find that transports cost for services are generally higher
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than those for goods and that a country being landlocked affects the trade of goods more
significantly than it does services.
For this paper, I intend to show by way of a both theoretical framework and empirical
analysis that trade in services and merchandise may not be independent of each other and
that the two go in tandem. The theoretical framework uses a general equilibrium model
with n countries, n finished goods, and n producer services. It assumes that each country is
endowed with fixed units of services and that goods are produced in an assembly technology.
The empirical model uses a panel data on 24 OECD counties and covers the periods 2000 to
2006. It considers a number of fixed effects specifications in controlling for any unobserved
factors that may exist.
3.3

Theoretical Framework
Consider a monopolistic competition world of n countries, n finished goods, and n

producer services. I assume that all goods and services are tradable. Each country i is
endowed with constant αi units of service i and 0 unit of service j 6= i.1 This indicates that
country i has comparative advantage in service i and disadvantage in all other services. Every
country i also produces a traded finished good in a constant elasticity assembly technology
given by:
(3.3)

θ
Xi = Σnj Sji

θ ∈ (0, 1),

i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n

where Xi is the production of the finished good in country i and Sji is usage of service j
by country i. Moreover, σ = 1/(1 − θ) is the constant elasticity of substitution for a pair
of producer services. Turning now to the demand side of the world economy, assume that
the consumer’s preference is identical across the globe and is represented in each country
i = 1, 2, 3, .., n, by the following utility function.
(3.4)

δ
ui = Σnk=1 Cki

δ ∈ (0, 1)

where Cki is the aggregate consumption of good k by country i and η = 1/(1 − δ) is the
1

This specification of the model is similar to Krugman (1980).
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constant demand elasticity. The first order conditions for consumption side of each economy
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n are given by:
(3.5)

δ−1
δCki
= λpki

(3.6)

k = 1, 2, 3, ..., n

Σnk=1 pki Cki = rii αi

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier (the shadow price), pki is the price of good k and rii is
the price of service i in country i. Note that rii αi is the national income measured from the
factor side. I assume that pki = dki pkk for all i, k = 1, 2, 3, .., n, where dki is the distance
from country k to country i. I further assume that dki = dik and normalize the distance
from a country to itself to unity, i.e., dii = 1 and dik > 1.
Given the service and good prices, the consumption side of each economy i has n + 1
equations and unknowns. These systems could be solved to obtain a system of finished good
demand functions. By doing so, I obtain:
(3.7)


Cji =

dki pkk
dji pjj

η 

rii αi
dmi pmm Cmi
− Σm=1,2,...,k−1,k+1,...,n
pki
dki pkk


j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n.

Hence given a numeraire good k, the demand for finished good j in country i depends on
the relative price of the good, the relative distance of country j to country i, a measure of
real national income in country i and a measure of global relative price index for finished
goods.
To complete the general equilibrium model, I now turn to production side of each
economy i. The first order conditions for the finished good problem in every country i can
be written as:
(3.8)

θ−1
θPii Sji
= rji

j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n
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where rji = dij rjj is the price of the producer service j in country i. Equation (3.8) gives
us the demand for producer service j in country i and could be rewritten as:
(3.9)


Sji =

pii θ
dji rjj

σ
j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n

This system of n equations depend on 2n commodity and service prices. To close the general
equilibrium system, I introduce the following 2n conditions that clear all global good and
service markets, resulting in 2n equilibrium good and service prices.
(3.10)

Σnj=1 Cij = Xi

i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n

(3.11)

Σnj=1 Sij = αi

i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n

The left hand sides of these equations are the global aggregate demand while the right hand
sides are the global aggregate supply of goods and services. The free entry and exit conditions
of monopolistic markets for finished goods imply the following zero-profit conditions.
(3.12)

pii Xi − Σnj=1 rji Sji = 0 i = 1, 2, 3, .., n

Finally, the trade balance condition for each country i is given by:
(3.13)

Σnj6=i rji Sji + Σnj6=i pji Cji = rii Σnj6=i Sij + pii Σnj6=i Cij

I substitute the equilibrium price of finished good i in country i, derived from equation
(3.12), in equation (3.9) to obtain:
(3.14)



θdki rkk Ski
θdki pkk Cki
θrii Sik σ
Sji = Σk6=i
+ Σk6=i
− Σk6=i
dji rjj Cik
dji rjj Cik
dji rjj Cik

Note that the first term is a measure of relative service price of j and relative distance from
i to j. The second term could be read as a measure aggregate consumption expenditure (i.e.
national income), while the third term is the relative price of home service.
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Equation (3.14) could be rewritten as:


θ
(3.15) Sji =
rjj



Σk6=i (rkk Ski /Cik )dki Σk6=i (Pkk Cki /Cik )dki Σk6=i (rii Sik /Cik )
+
−
dji
dji
dji

σ

Another interpretation is that the imports of service by country i from country j depends on the relative price service j (in country j), the average share of imported services per $ of finished good export for all trade partners (weighted by relative distance),
the relative distance of between i and j (with respect to a measure of average distance,
dˆi = Σk6=i (pkk Cki /Cik )dki , and the average share of imported services per $ of finished good
export for all trade partners (weighted by relative distance).
I could alternatively use equation (3.9) and (3.12) to get the following equation for
imports of service j (from country j) by country i:
(3.16)

Sji = [θ(

rkk 1 σ
)( )]
rjj d¯ji
di

where d¯i = Σnk=1 (Ski /Xi )dki is the weighted average distance to country i. Interestingly,
the weights are the relative importance of each service factor, i.e. the the service per unit
of country i’s finished good. According to (3.14), the imports of service by country i from
country j depends on a measure of relative prices, and the distance.
Hence, I conclude from (3.7) and (3.14) that merchandise trade and service trade are
simultaneously determined. That is:
(3.17)

Cji = f (Sji , dji , Pji , rji )

(3.18)

Sij

= g(Cji , dji , Pji , rji )

In the remaining sections of this chapter, I shall provide empirical support for this proposition.
3.4

Empirical Analysis
For the empirical analysis I use panel data to estimate the gravity equation established

in the preceding section. A fixed effects model helps to reduce any potential bias resulting
from omitted variables. By using panel data, the researcher also has the advantage of using
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both cross sectional and time series information in analyzing empirical relationship. It also
increases the number of observations, implying increased degrees of freedom and reduces
any collinearity among the explanatory variables (Hurlin and Venet, 2001). One drawback
of using panel data is that one has to deal with issues such as attrition and non response.
The data spans seven years from 2000 to 2006 and covers 24 OECD countries and 175
trading partners which includes both OECD and non-OECD countries; the data is however
unbalanced. This is mainly due to the fact that there is a variation in the number of trading
partners for each reporter of merchandise and service trade. Thus, there is a total of 12,803
observations with 2882 bilateral trade pairs in this dataset.
3.4.1

Data

Tables 3.E.1 and 3.E.2 present a list of all 24 reporting countries and their partner
countries. Data availability for service and merchandise trade was the main criterion for
selecting these countries. A list of all variables employed in the analysis and their summary
statistics can be found in Table 3.E.3. The data on electricity consumption has the most
number of missing values. The source of the data on distance between trading partners,
common colonizer dummy, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Regional Trade Agreement
(RTA), population, common official language, and contiguity is the CEPII gravity dataset.
The CEPII dataset provides a "square" dataset of all possible world trade country pairs
from 1948 to 2006. GDP data is presented in current US dollars. RTA is a dummy variable;
1 for when the two trading countries are part of a regional trade agreement and 0 otherwise.
The common colonizer dummy signifies trading partners that have a common colonizer
post 1945. The contiguity dummy represents bilateral trade pairs that share a common
border. Common official language works in a similar fashion when both parties speak the
same language. See Head et al. (2010) for a complete description of the CEPII dataset and
methodologies used in their derivation.
Data on electricity consumption, mobile and internet subscription come from the World
Bank’s database. Internet usage is expressed per 100 people. Electricity consumption is
expressed in kilowatt-hour per capita; it measures total production by power and heat plants
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net of losses from transmission, transformation, distribution and through their own use. The
mobile variable represents subscription to public mobile telephone service measured per 100
people. This includes both post-paid and prepaid subscription.
Data on service imports come from the OECD statistics database. Service imports
aggregate all service imports by a reporter from a specific trading partner and is measured
in million US dollars. Merchandise data comes from the United Nations’ COMTRADE data.
They are also of an aggregated form and are measured in current US dollars.
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3.4.2
3.4.2.1

Empirical Model
Model Specification

I use a fixed effects model for the estimation process. In estimating an empirical model
one often wonders if all explanatory variables are included in the estimation. There could be
omitted bias if some explanatory variables are excluded from the estimation. There could
also be time-invariant unobservable factors that affect both the left-hand and right-hand side
of a model simultaneously which could also cause bias. A fixed effects model helps control
for these. This also helps account for the issue of multilateral resistances raised by Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2001) as suggested by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), Feenstra (2004), and
Rose and Van Wincoop (2001). Adam and Cobham (2007) argue that including only country
specific fixed effects is only a partial solution to controlling for multilateral resistances. They
assert that unless these fixed effects are interacted with time, then country fixed effects will
only be accounting for the average trade resistance over time. Discussions about what the
appropriate form of fixed effect specification and the best way to control for unobserved
factors has been ongoing for some time. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003), and Glick and
Rose (2002) incorporate individual fixed effects in their specification. Other fixed effect
specifications used in gravity models can be found in Cheng and Wall (2005). Baltagi et al.
(2003) recommend that one should control for as much heterogeneity as possible and that
the omission of significant interaction terms may lead to biases. They recommend adding
individual effects, and importer and exporter specific time-variant effects.
For the empirical analysis I use the model specification proposed by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003). Since the developed model in the theory section puts forward the possibility of
a simultaneous relationship between merchandise and service trade, I estimate the following
equations:
log Xijt = β1 log Sijt + β2 log Yit + β3 log Yjt + β4 log Dij
(3.19)

+β5 log Pit + β6 log Pjt + αi + γj + δij + θt + x + ijt
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log Sijt = η1 log Xijt + η2 log Yit + η3 log Yjt + η4 log Dij
(3.20)

+η5 log Pit + η6 log Pjt + αi + γj + δij + θt + x + µijt

where Sijt and Xijt denote country i’s service imports and merchandise exports respectively
from country j at time t. Dij represents the distance between the respective trading countries. Ymt and Pmt for m = i, j represent the GDPs and populations of the trading countries
respectively at time t. x represents a vector of other variables, including regional trade agreement (RTA), common language, common colonial relationship, and contiguity. δij captures
country-pair fixed effects and I assume that δij 6=δji , this implies that country-pair effects
may vary with the direction of trade. δij controls for any unobserved bilateral influences
on trade. θt represents time effects. It captures time varying effects such as changes in
openness and business cycles across countries. αi and γj represent country specific effects.
These account for unobserved country specific attributes that impact a country’s decision
to engage in trade. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) explain that these may reflect or capture
a country’s propensity to import or export. µit and it are the log normally distributed
idiosyncratic error terms.
The advantage of using a log transformation in estimating the gravity model lies in the
ease of interpreting the estimated coefficients. With the log-linear estimation, βi as well
as ηi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 represent elasticities of merchandise exports and service imports
respectively, with respect to the corresponding explanatory variables. The GDP variables
may be seen as a measure of economic size and for that reason, one should expect that as the
economies of countries expand, they engage in more trade. The coefficients β2 and β3 as well
as η2 and η3 should all have positive signs. The coefficients on distance β4 and η4 are expected
to be negative. This is because the farther a country is from its trading partner the higher
the transportation costs. The elasticities of merchandise and service trade with respect to
the population of the reporting country and its trading partner may be either positive or
negative. A large domestic market, even in the presence of an increasing population may
be less inclined to trade if domestic production is absorbed by its economic agents. In
which case the coefficients will be negative. On the other hand, a large domestic market
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may enjoy economies of scale so that it produces a variety of goods and gains comparative
advantage in others. In this case the sign on the coefficients will be positive. The sign of the
population coefficients thus depends on which of these (whether absorption or economies
of scale) is more prominent. Bergstrand (1989) provides an alternative explanation as to
why the population coefficients may have a negative sign. He explains that the signs may
depend on whether the goods in question are capital or labor intensive so that the sign for
the exporter’s population is negative when traded goods are capital intensive. The effects
of common colonizer post 1945, contiguity, and RTA on the merchandise and services trade
are expected to be positive.
To estimate a fixed-effects model one could either use the within estimation or the least
square dummy variable method (LSDV). The within transformation works well for a gravity
model with balanced panel and is useful in eliminating any monadic effects that may exist.
However in the case of an unbalanced panel, the demeaning process may ensure that units
that have only one time period are excluded from the estimation process. Baltagi (1995)
also explains that within transformation may not be appropriate for unbalanced panels. In
such a situation the LSDV approach may be viable option, however this approach can be
cumbersome when you have to deal with a large number of dummies. More importantly, the
use of large number of dummies may represent a significant decline in degrees of freedom.
In my analysis, there are 2882 country-pairs, using the LSDV approach would require 2882
dummies to control for unobserved country-pair effects.2
3.4.2.2

Unbalanced Panels and Zeros

Most bilateral trade data are unbalanced. This means data for some cross-sections for
certain time periods are not available. For example, one country may trade with another
country in one particular year, but not in subsequent years. If the data for this country pair
data is missing at random, in which case the reason for being missing is uncorrelated with
the idiosyncratic errors then unbalanced panels pose no problems. Also Wooldridge (2012)
2

The STATA program reghdfe implements the fixed-point iteration proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2009). It uses an algorithm that is mainly based on the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem.

51
explains that using fixed effects has the advantage of allowing attrition to be correlated with
the unobserved effects.
It is not uncommon to find zero trade flows in bilateral trade data even in the case of
aggregated data. Zeros in trade data may be attributed to non-reporting or omission often
associated with small or insignificant values of trade or the absence of actual trade between
two countries. The consequence of estimating equation 3.19 and 3.20 using a log-linear model
is that zero-trade flows are automatically dropped out of the estimation process because the
log of zero is undefined. This could potentially lead to an estimation bias. To mitigate
this issue of zeros, one may simply truncate the sample by dropping these observations. As
noted earlier this method can lead to estimation bias if these are not randomly distributed,
especially since zero-trade may reflect hindrances to trade due to distance or a country being
landlocked.
Another way of handling zero trade flows often used in literature is to add a very small
positive number to all trade flows so that logs are no longer undefined. There is however no
rule of thumb as to how small or large this “small positive value” should be. This method is
only appropriate if we have real zeros or almost zero trade flows. However using this method
has its disadvantages. Flowerdew and Aitkin (1982) as well as King (1988) demonstrate how
variations in the value of this “small positive constant” can drastically change estimation
results. In some instances, one can generate any desired value for his estimates by simply
altering the value of this constant Burger et al. (2009).
Alternatively, to get around the issue of zeros, one might consider not using a log-linear
specification at all and only estimate the gravity model in its multiplicative form. Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) propose using either the Non-Linear Least Squares (NLS) or the Pseudo
Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML) in estimating the gravity model. They
however, show that the PPML has more desirable properties. They argue that due to the
Jensen’s Inequality E(lnij ) 6= ln(E(ij )) the variance of the estimated parameters is biased.
Another nonlinear estimator often used is the Tobit estimator on the log of trade and a
constant with left-censoring at zero. The Tobit estimator has been criticized on the grounds
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that it is only appropriate in situations where small trade values are rounded to zero. A
number of other nonlinear estimators that have been used in literature include the Gamma
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (GPML) as used in Manning and Mullahy (2001) and Feasible
Generalized Least Squares proposed by Martínez-Zarzoso (2013).
For the empirical analysis in this paper, the Heckman (1979) sample selection model is
used. The intuition here is that zero trade flows may result from or reflect a country’s (or
its firms) decision not to export/import to/from certain markets (Bacchetta et al., 2012).
Zero-trade may also reflect huge fixed cost of trade. In this case positive trade flows between
two countries can be said to be correlated with certain unobserved characteristics specific to
that country-pair. This procedure involves a two step method of estimation; the first steps
involves determining the probability of positive or non-zero trade flows between any trading
pair. This requires running a probit model to determine whether two countries trade or not
then computing the inverse mills ratios. The second step involves estimating the gravity
equation given that there is positive on non-zero trade. The inverse mills ratio is included as
a variable in the second step. A significant coefficient on the mills ratio justifies correcting
for sample bias. It should be noted however that, the first step involves using a variable
that explains only the decision to trade but not the value or level of trade. Helpman
et al. (2007) use common language and common religion dummies as selection variables.
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) advice including all independent regressors used in the
second step in the selection process. Table 3.E.4 shows the proportion of zeros in the service
and merchandise variables. The services variable has 12% of observations being zeros. This
is not surprising even for aggregate service data since some countries may not import services
from all countries in the sample.
3.4.3

Empirical Results

In estimating equation 3.20, the Heckman two step procedure was implemented. In the
first step the probability of non-zero trade is determined using a probit model. Common
official language dummies as well as dummies that represent when a country is landlocked
were used to explain a country’s decision to engage in trade. The results for the first step
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is presented in Table 3.E.5. As expected the GDPs of the trading countries are significant
in the selection process. They both have the expected positive signs which signify that as
the incomes of countries improve they are more likely to engage in trade. Distance poses
as a barrier to trade since a trading partner’s remoteness translates into huge transportation costs. One will thus expect distance to have an inverse relationship with a country’s
decision to trade. The results show that the distance coefficient has a negative sign and is
significant. The coefficient for regional trade agreement is also positive and significant. This
indicates that regional trade agreements may increase a country’s or its firms’ likelihood
to engage in trade. The estimation results also reveal that the population of the country’s
partner decreases its likelihood to engage in trade. The coefficient for the reporting country’s population is positive but not significant. Table 3.E.5 also indicates that if a partner
is landlocked it reduces a country’s likelihood of trading with that particular partner holding all else constant. However, a country being landlocked has no significant effect on its
decision to trade. Common language, common colonizer post 1945, and contiguity are not
significant in a country’s decision to trade.
Since the theory postulates that service and merchandise trade may be jointly determined and hence endogenous, there is a need to instrument for merchandise in the services
equation and do same for services in the merchandise equation. A valid instrumenting process requires that the instruments be correlated with the endogenous variables but not with
the error term. Also there should be at least as many instruments as there are endogenous variables so that the equation is either identified or over-identified. I used the lag of
merchandise trade and electricity consumption in the reporting country to instrument for
merchandise in equation 3.20. Similarly, the lag of services, and mobile phone subscription,
as well as internet subscription of the reporting country are used as instruments for services
in equation 3.19. A Sargan-Hansen test was used to evaluate the validity of the instruments used. At the 1% level, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments used
for merchandise and services are valid instruments. A Hausman test for the endogeneity
of merchandise and services reveals that the estimate are consistent. The results for the
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Sargan-Hansen and Hausman tests are presented in the Appendix section of this paper.
The first stage results are also presented in Table 3.E.6.
Table 3.E.8 shows the estimation results for equation 3.20. For comparison purposes
the results for the OLS and random effects estimation are included. The first model is an
OLS regression with merchandise being an exogenous regressor whilst in the second model
is the OLS regression ran with merchandise treated as an endogenous variable. The third
model is a random effects model. The fourth and fifth models are OLS estimations with
dummy variables; in the fifth model however, Guimarães and Portugal (2009) algorithm is
used in estimating the OLS with dummy variables. Merchandise is significant in all models
except for model two. It has a positive sign signifying that merchandise trade may be
directly related to trade in services. The GDPs of both trading countries are significant
in all the models and bear the expected signs. This lends support to the fundamental
gravity theory that the income of the trading countries has a positive impact on trade flows.
Distance is only significant in the first three models and has the expected negative sign
except in the fixed effects model. Contiguity and common colonizer post 1945 are both
not significant in any of the models and do not seem to affect services trade. The impact
of the importing country’s population on bilateral services trade is negative and significant
in all models. Correspondingly, the influence of the exporting country’s population is also
negative but only significant in the first two models. If the importing and exporting country
are members of a regional trade agreement then bilateral service trade increases in the OLS
models but decreases in the random and fixed effects models. Regional trade agreements
are however not significant in the fixed effects models. In all the models except the second
model, the coefficient of the inverse mills ratio is significant. This implies that correcting
for sample selection bias is valid. For comparison purposes, Table 3.E.9 presents the result
for the fixed effects model without correcting for selection bias. Evidently, the results do
not change significantly when zero-trade values are dropped from the estimation process.
The estimation results for equation 3.19 are presented in Table 3.E.7. The coefficient for
services is positive and significant in all the models. The elasticities in this case are generally
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smaller than what they were in the services equation. This will suggest that services have
a higher effect on bilateral merchandise trade than in the reverse case. The GDPs of both
exporting and importing countries are significant in all the models. As expected distance
has a negative impact on bilateral merchandise trade but is only significant in the OLS and
random effects models. Contiguity is only significant in the OLS model. The population
of the exporting country has a positive and significant impact in model one but has a
significant negative impact in the fixed and random effects model. The coefficient of the
importing country’s population is significant and has a negative sign in the fixed effects
model. Regional trade agreement has a positive and significant coefficient in all the models
except for the OLS model. If the trading parties share a common colonizer, the results
indicate that bilateral merchandise trade is positively impacted; this is so in all the models.
Also included in this chapter are the estimation results for alternative fixed effects
specification used in literature. They are included to aid comparison with the fixed effects
specification used in equation 3.19 and 3.20. Table 3.E.10 and Table 3.E.11 present the
results for the alternative fixed effects estimation for services and merchandise respectively.
Model 1 implements the fixed effects specification used in Matyas (1998) and Rose and
Van Wincoop (2001). It incorporates exporter, importer and time effects. Model 2 is a fixed
effects model that controls for unobservable time invariant characteristics and includes only
time dummies. This fixed effects specification is seen in Micco et al. (2003). In a like manner,
Model 3 uses a fixed effect model suggested in Glick and Rose (2002) and Henderson and
Millimet (2008); it captures unobserved country-pair effects. Bussière and Schnatz (2009)
include country-pair and time fixed effects in their model. This specification is presented in
Model 4. Model 5, 6, and 7 include reporter-period, reporter and country-pair, and partner
and country-pair dummies, respectively.3
For the bilateral services trade estimation, the coefficient of bilateral Merchandise trade
is significant and positive in all the fixed effects specifications used except in Model 3 where
only unobserved country-pair effects are captured. Bilateral services’ elasticity with respect
3

Gómez-Herrera (2013) provides a comprehensive list of publications on gravity model estimations and
the fixed effects specifications used in them.
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to the income (GDP) of the importing country is significant in all the specifications and
bears the appropriate sign. The income of the exporting country however has the wrong
sign in the first model but it is not significant. All the other specifications produce the
appropriate sign and the coefficients are significant. The impact of distance is also negative
and significant. The population of the importing country is negative and significant whilst
the population of the exporting country is negative and significant only in the first, second,
and fifth fixed effects specification. The influence of regional trade agreements is only positive
and significant in the second, fifth, and seventh models. The coefficient of the inverse mills
ratio is also significant in all models except Model 3, providing validity for the correction of
sample selection bias.
From the estimation results of bilateral merchandise trade presented in Table 3.E.11,
one can see that bilateral service trade is significant in the second, third, fourth, and seventh
fixed effects specifications. The elasticity of merchandise trade with respect to the importer
is positive and very significant. Similarly, in the case of the exporter’s income, it is only
insignificant in the first model. Distance, contiguity, regional trade agreement, and common
colonizer are significant and possess the appropriate signs. The coefficient for the population
of the exporter is negative but only significant in the third, fourth, and seventh specification.
That of the importing country is negative as well but not significant in the first and third
fixed effects specifications.
3.5

Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between merchandise and service trade. It

provides a theoretical framework as well as empirical analysis to evaluate this relationship.
The theoretical analysis uses a general equilibrium model with n countries, n finished goods,
and n producer services. The theoretical findings suggest that merchandise and service trade
may be simultaneously determined.
The empirical section of this paper uses a panel data on 24 OECD and their trading
partners. To estimate the proposed theoretical model, the data for the periods 2000 to 2006
was considered. The fixed effects estimation method was based on the Least Square Dummy
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variable approach. In addition unobserved country-pair, exporter, importer, and time effects
were controlled for. In the estimation process alternative fixed effects specifications used in
existing literature were considered. Also, since the proposed theoretical model suggests that
bilateral merchandise trade and bilateral services are simultaneous determined, I control for
endogeneity in the estimation by using the lag of services, mobile and Internet subscription
of the reporting country as instruments for bilateral services flows in the merchandise trade
estimations. Likewise, electricity, and lag of merchandise are used as instruments for merchandise trade in the bilateral service trade estimation. To control for zero-trade flows this
study employs a two-step Heckman procedure in the estimation of bilateral services trade. A
Hausman test was done to validate the proposed simultaneous relationship between service
and merchandise trade.
In addition to the income of both trading countries, distance, the population of the
partner country, and regional trade agreement, the first stage (selection process) results of
the Heckman indicates that a partner country being landlocked has a bearing on a country’s decision to trade. The Hausman test shows that treating merchandise and services as
endogenous regressors yields consistent estimates. The results also indicates that correcting
for sample selection bias is valid. However, they do not change much when selection bias is
ignored. The empirical analysis finds support for the proposed theoretical model as services
is positive and significant in determining merchandise trade and vice versa. The results
also suggest that having a common colonizer post 1945, is more likely to boost trade in
merchandise, than for services trade.
A possible extension of this work would involve performing the same analysis at the firm
or industry level using disaggregated data to investigate the relationship between services
and merchandise by sectors.
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Appendices
3.A

Testing Instruments for Merchandise
Underidentification Test
Ho: Equation is underidentified
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 196.733

P-value = 0.000

Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions
Ho: Instruments are valid
Hansen J statistic = 0.186

3.B

P-value = 0.6665

Testing Instruments for Services
Underidentification Test
Ho: Equation is underidentified
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 195.478

P-value = 0.000

Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions
Ho: Instruments are valid
Hansen J statistic = 3.954

P-value = 0.1385
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3.C

Test of Endogeneity for Services

Table 3.C.1: Hausman Test for
Coefficients
(b)
(B)
endogenous exogenous
Merchandise
0.1310761
0.105612
GDP_R1
1.776826
1.341419
GDP_P1
0.4199906
0.283429
POP_R
-10.45209
-7.90604
POP_P -0.7125357
-1.1345
RTA -0.0378677
-0.20319
Mills Ratio
1.265605
-0.28868

Endogeneity for Services
(b-B)
Difference
0.0254637
0.4354071
0.1365615
-2.546047
0.4219595
0.1653221
1.55428

sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
S.E.
0.0287812
0.0976158
0.0544962
0.8144019
0.39555
0.0429147
0.3227836

b = consistent under Ho and Ha
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
χ28 = (b − B)0 [(Vb − VB )−1 ](b − B) = 49.43

Prob > χ27 = 0.0000
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3.D

Test of Endogeneity for Merchandise
Table 3.D.1: Hausman Test for Endogeneity for Merchandise
Coefficients
(b)
(B)
(b-B)
sqrt(diag(V_bV_B))
endogenous exogenous Difference
S.E.
Service
GDP_R1
GDP_P1
POP_R
POP_P
RTA

0.04296
0.668881
0.624916
-4.75852
-0.69501
0.136106

0.0534881
0.6445382
0.5770407
-5.191421
-0.5361267
0.0858876

-0.0105283
0.0243432
0.0478751
0.4329015
-0.1588788
0.0502183

0.00917
0.033206
0.014853
0.267265
0.147163
0.010787

b = consistent under Ho and Ha
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
χ28 = (b − B)0 [(Vb − VB )−1 ](b − B) = 38.54

Prob > χ26 = 0.0000
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3.E

Tables
Table 3.E.1: List of O.E.C.D Reporting Countries
Czech Republic
France
Ireland
Germany
Italy Luxembourg
Austria
Australia
Netherlands
Slovenia
Japan
Portugal
Estonia
Finland
Canada
Norway
Denmark
Greece
Hungary New Zealand
Belgium
Poland Slovak Republic
Korea, Rep.
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Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cayman Islands
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia

Table 3.E.2: List of Partner Countries

Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Faeroe Islands
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong SAR, China
Hungary
Iceland
India

Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea, Dem. Rep.
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia

Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Samoa
San Marino
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Tanzania

Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Table 3.E.3: Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
year
2003.745
1.754
electricity(Partner)
4754.071
5204.554
electricity(Reporter)
8114.63
4312.297
Distance
5707.711
4051.696
mobile(Partner)
45.685
36.945
internet
22.864
24.174
mobile_R
89.206
20.106
Internet(Reporter)
47.673
18.545
Contiguity
0.034
0.182
Common Official language
0.075
0.263
Common Colonizer
0.004
0.061
Population(Reporter)
20.755
25.06
GDP(Reporter)
558113.13
797043.614
Population(Partner)
52.797
169.269
GDP(Partner)
424483.741
1409435.706
RTA
0.288
0.453
Merchandise
1739399602.327 9236736415.089
Services
420.919
1875.349
landlocked(Reporter)
.2307272
.4213146
landlocked(Partner)
.1780052
.382532

Table 3.E.4: Proportion of Zeros
Variable Observations Missing Zeros
Services
Merchandise

12803
12803

0
0

1598
0

% zero
12%
0%

N
12803
10521
12803
12803
12751
12478
12803
12704
12803
12803
12803
12803
12803
12652
12034
12803
12803
12803
12803
12803
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Table 3.E.5: Probit Model
selection(Service Trade)
GDP(Importer)
0.196∗∗∗
(0.03)
GDP(Exporter)

0.437∗∗∗
(0.02)

Distance

-0.287∗∗∗
(0.04)

Contiguity

0
(.)

Population(Importer)

0.0350
(0.03)

Population(Exporter)

-0.0461∗∗
(0.02)

RTA

0.563∗∗∗
(0.11)

Common Colonizer

0
(.)

Landlocked(Importer)

-0.0688
(0.04)

Landlocked(Exporter)

-0.237∗∗∗
(0.05)

common Official language

0.00321
(0.07)

_cons

-11.61∗∗∗
(0.86)
11511

N
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

70

Table 3.E.6: First Stage Results
Variables
Merchandise
Service
GDP(Reporter)

0.819***
(10.05)

1.654***
(12.47)

GDP(Partner)

0.670***
(16.27)

0.448***
(6.76)

Population(Reporter)

-5.344***
(-8.02)

-9.629***
(-7.98)

Population(Partner)

-0.269
(-0.82)

-1.210*
(-2.15)

RTA

0.160***
(4.33)

-0.117*
(-2.15)

Mills Ratio

0.841*
(2.35)

Lag of Merchandise

0.464***
(23.67)

Electricity(Reporter)

-0.0000116
(-0.59)

Internet(Reporter)

0.00244
(1.58)

Lag of Service

0.479***
(22.97)

Mobile(Reporter)

0.000871
(0.81)

_cons

-6.276*
(-2.22)

-11.13*
(-2.32)

N
R-sq

7722
0.462

7771
0.454
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Table 3.E.7: Estimation Results for Merchandise Trade
Merchandise
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
OLS
OLS/IV
FE
RE
Fixed/HD
Service

0.34***
(0.01)

0.10*
(0.04)

0.04**
(0.01)

0.03**
(0.01)

0.04*
(0.02)

GDP(Exporter)

0.55***
(0.02)

0.96***
(0.08)

0.67***
(0.09)

0.62***
(0.05)

0.67***
(0.1)

GDP(Importer)

0.61***
(0.01)

0.85***
(0.04)

0.62***
(0.04)

0.71***
(0.04)

0.62***
(0.04)

Distance

-0.74***
(0.02)

-0.89***
(0.04)

-4.71
(4.76)

-1.26***
(0.05)

Contiguity

0.11**
(0.04)

0.34***
(0.06)

-1.62
(2.23)

0.24
(0.12)

Population(Exporter)

0.23***
(0.02)

0.06
(0.04)

-4.76***
(0.66)

-4.27***
(0.71)

-4.76***
(0.78)

Population(Importer)

0.01
(0.01)

-0.06***
(0.02)

-0.70*
(0.3)

-0.17
(0.31)

-0.70*
(0.35)

RTA

0.02
(0.03)

0.09**
(0.03)

0.14***
(0.03)

0.12***
(0.03)

0.14***
(0.03)

1.26***
(0.14)

1.74***
(0.2)

4.01***
(0.33)

1.85***
(0.28)

-11.66***
(0.64)
10564
0.875

-22.39***
(1.97)
7771
0.865

51.13
(54.51)
7771
0.986

7.48***
(1.79)
7771

Common Colonizer
_cons
N
adj. R2

-1.93
(3.24)
7771
0.986
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Table 3.E.8: Estimation Results for Service Trade
Service
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

OLS

OLS/IV

RE

FE

FE/HD

Merchandise

0.55***
(0.01)

0.08
(0.08)

0.11***
(0.03)

0.13**
(0.04)

0.13*
(0.05)

GDP(Importer)

1.25***
(0.03)

1.82***
(0.1)

1.39***
(0.09)

1.78***
(0.14)

1.78***
(0.16)

GDP(Exporter)

0.62***
(0.02)

1.00***
(0.07)

0.36***
(0.07)

0.42***
(0.08)

0.42***
(0.1)

Distance

-0.32***
(0.02)

-0.75***
(0.08)

-1.16***
(0.07)

2.06
(31.27)

Contiguity

0
(.)

0
(.)

Population(Importer)

-0.78***
(0.02)

-0.83***
(0.03)

-7.86***
(1.27)

-10.45***
(1.09)

-10.45***
(1.29)

Population(Exporter)

-0.25***
(0.01)

-0.28***
(0.02)

-0.33
(0.55)

-0.71
(0.56)

-0.71
(0.66)

0.11*
(0.04)

0.11*
(0.05)

-0.17**
(0.06)

-0.04
(0.07)

-0.04
(0.08)

RTA
Common Colonizer
Mills Ratio
_cons
N
adj. R2

0
(.)

0
(.)

0.98***
(0.14)

0.35
(0.21)

-1.49***
(0.29)

1.27*
(0.55)

1.27*
(0.64)

-36.50***
(0.72)
10085
0.807

-48.66***
(2.2)
7722
0.777

3.51
(3.11)
7722

-39.58
(358.3)
7722
0.961

-15.55**
(5.56)
7722
0.961
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Table 3.E.9: Truncated Sample Services Estimation
Service
(1)
Fixed Effects
Merchandise
0.13∗
(0.05)
GDP(Importer)

1.65∗∗∗
(0.16)

GDP(Exporter)

0.33∗∗∗
(0.09)

Population(Importer)

-9.82∗∗∗
(1.24)

Population(Exporter)

-1.06
(0.64)

RTA

-0.10
(0.07)

_cons

-10.20∗
(5.20)
8114
0.964

N
adj. R2

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.E.10: Results for Alternative Fixed Effects Specification for Service Trade
Services
Merchandise

(1)
0.15∗
(0.06)

(2)
0.24∗∗∗
(0.07)

(3)
0.10
(0.05)

(4)
0.13∗
(0.05)

GDP(Importer)

0.71∗∗
(0.23)

1.71∗∗∗
(0.09)

1.43∗∗∗
(0.10)

1.78∗∗∗
(0.16)

GDP(Exporter)

-0.07
(0.13)

0.86∗∗∗
(0.06)

0.51∗∗∗
(0.08)

0.42∗∗∗
(0.10)

Distance

-1.00∗∗∗
(0.09)

-0.59∗∗∗
(0.07)

Population(Importer)

-5.77∗∗
(2.02)

-0.91∗∗∗
(0.03)

-9.56∗∗∗
(1.27)

-10.45∗∗∗
(1.28)

Population(Exporter)

-2.31∗
(0.98)

-0.27∗∗∗
(0.01)

0.11
(0.59)

-0.71
(0.65)

-0.26∗∗∗
(0.01)

-0.72
(0.66)

RTA

-0.07
(0.07)

0.15∗∗
(0.05)

-0.09
(0.08)

-0.04
(0.08)

0.23∗∗∗
(0.05)

-0.00
(0.08)

-0.25∗
(0.12)

Mills Ratio

-2.95∗∗∗
(0.31)

0.80∗∗∗
(0.19)

0.51
(0.64)

1.27∗
(0.64)

1.08∗∗∗
(0.19)

1.70∗∗
(0.63)

2.53
(1.29)

_cons

25.90∗∗
(8.65)

-46.60∗∗∗
(2.02)

-12.40∗∗∗
(1.98)

-15.55∗∗
(5.55)

-2.87∗∗∗
(0.52)

5.57
(3.00)

-11.62∗∗
(4.25)

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
7722
0.873

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
7722
0.801

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
7722
0.961

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
7722
0.961

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
7722
0.819

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
7722
0.963

No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
7722
0.963

Effects
Importer
Exporter
Time
Country-Pair
Reporter-period
Partner-period
N
adj. R2

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

(5)
0.17∗
(0.07)

(6)
0.12∗
(0.05)

(7)
0.15∗∗
(0.05)

1.96∗∗∗
(0.16)
0.92∗∗∗
(0.06)

0.44∗∗∗
(0.09)

-0.69∗∗∗
(0.07)
-10.62∗∗∗
(1.33)
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Table 3.E.11: Fixed Effects Estimation for Merchandise
(1)
-0.00278
(0.03)

(2)
0.0996∗
(0.04)

(3)
0.0367∗
(0.02)

(4)
0.0430∗
(0.02)

GDP(Exporter)

0.361
(0.19)

1.024∗∗∗
(0.08)

0.626∗∗∗
(0.06)

0.669∗∗∗
(0.10)

GDP(Importer)

0.682∗∗∗
(0.09)

0.836∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.701∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.625∗∗∗
(0.04)

Distance

-1.223∗∗∗
(0.05)

-0.882∗∗∗
(0.04)

-0.958∗∗∗
(0.04)

Contiguity

0.244∗∗∗
(0.06)

0.339∗∗∗
(0.06)

0.418∗∗∗
(0.06)

Population(Exporter)

-3.098
(1.60)

-0.0150
(0.04)

-4.472∗∗∗
(0.77)

-4.759∗∗∗
(0.77)

Population(Importer)

-1.351
(0.73)

-0.0588∗∗∗
(0.02)

-0.123
(0.33)

-0.695∗
(0.35)

-0.0807∗∗∗
(0.02)

-0.770∗
(0.34)

RTA

0.101∗
(0.04)

0.104∗∗
(0.03)

0.132∗∗∗
(0.03)

0.136∗∗∗
(0.03)

0.143∗∗∗
(0.03)

0.144∗∗∗
(0.03)

0.182∗∗∗
(0.05)

1.955∗∗∗
(0.19)

1.869∗∗∗
(0.21)

13.22
(7.28)

-23.67∗∗∗
(2.17)

-4.821∗∗∗
(1.16)

-1.929
(3.24)

3.395∗∗∗
(0.26)

4.157∗∗
(1.46)

14.13∗∗∗
(2.50)

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
7771
0.919

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
7771
0.868

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
7771
0.986

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
7771
0.986

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
7771
0.881

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
7771
0.986

No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
7771
0.988

Merchandise
Service

Common Colonizer
_cons
Effects
Importer
Exporter
Time
Country-Pair
Reporter-period
Partner-period
N
adj. R2

Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

(5)
0.00213
(0.04)

(6)
0.0333
(0.02)

(7)
0.0357∗
(0.02)
0.621∗∗∗
(0.10)

0.926∗∗∗
(0.04)

0.636∗∗∗
(0.04)

-5.111∗∗∗
(0.73)

1.974∗∗∗
(0.22)
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CHAPTER 4
ENVIRONMENT, GROWTH, AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

4.1

Abstract
This chapter examines the effects of foreign direct investment inflows and environ-

mental aid disbursements on environmental degradation using panel data for some selected
developing countries. Using a fixed effects model, the estimates suggest the existence of an
Environmental Kuznets Curve for carbon dioxide as well as total green house gas emissions
from the energy and industrial sectors but there was no evidence of this phenomenon for
nitrous oxide and total Green House Gas emissions from the waste sector. I also find a hint
of a technique effect, and investigate it further by exploring the responsiveness of capital
and labor to investment inflows in the respective developing countries.
4.2

Introduction
The world community has paid more attention to climatic issues and the effects of

green house gases in recent decades. The Kyoto protocol is an example, which is aimed at
reducing six green house gases through three mechanisms enshrined in the protocol. Under
the protocol Non-Annex I Parties have no commitment to reducing their green house gas
emissions. This could be a possible factor in the “migration” of dirty industries to less
developed countries. To put the difference between emissions from developed countries and
those of the developing ones into perspective, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(CDIAC) ranked countries by their per capita fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions in 2009.
Accordingly, developing countries like Mali, Chad, and Burundi emitted 0.01 metric tons of
carbon each, whilst developed countries like Australia, United States and Canada produced
4.98, 4.64, 4.16 metric tons of carbon, respectively.
Environmental quality can be considered as a normal good. This can explain why
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developing countries have more lax environmental regulation stringencies or weaker environmental monitoring systems and institutions than developed countries. The pollution
haven hypothesis (PHH, hereafter) posits that a country with lax environmental regulations
in comparison to its trading partners could see an influx of investments to its dirty industries. According to UNCTAD STAT FDI inflows to developing countries have increased from
about 34,762 million dollars in 1990 to 702,825 million dollars in 2012, i.e., about 1921%
increase in inflows. Developing Asian economies receive the largest portion of these inflows.
Inflows to developed countries have also increased however by a much smaller margin of
225%. Consequently, developing countries have overtaking the developed countries in FDI
receipts as of 2012.
Within the aforementioned time frame, Blanco et al. (2013) report that carbon emissions
from developing countries have almost doubled. This could suggest that investment may
be causing an increase in emissions in developing countries, especially if firms in a quest
to avoid the higher cost associated with using greener technology relocate to less developed
countries.1 Interestingly, foreign aid to developing countries aimed at pollution abatement
activities have increased significantly within the period of study. These have also motivated
us to investigate the effects of FDI and environmental aid on carbon dioxide and total green
house gas emissions in developing countries.
4.3

Literature Review
The literature on the environment is extensive and can be traced back to pioneering

works such as Baumol (1971) and Crocker (1966). The paper is particularly related to two
strands of literature: pollution haven hypothesis (for example, see Eskeland and Harrison,
2003 and Taylor, 2004) and the literature on the relationship between economic growth and
development and environmental degradation (see Arrow et al., 1995 and Stern et al., 1996).
Following the seminal work of Kuznets (1955) that suggested an inverted u-shaped
relationship between income inequality and economic growth, Panayotou (1993) suggested an
apparent inverted u-shaped relationship between environmental degradation and economic
1

FDIs inflow to less developing countries may also be due to the expected rate of return on investment
foreign firms believe they can obtain.
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development, known in the literature as Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Although
Panayotou (1993) first coined the term EKC, Grossman and Krueger (1991) established EKC
relationship using cross-sectional data for 42 countries’ urban areas and three pollutants to
study the relationship between air quality and economic growth.
The pollution haven hypothesis posits that weaker environmental regulations should be
an influencing factor in the location of polluting industries. Becker and Henderson (2000)
uses plant data during 1963-1992 to study the unintended consequence of environmental
regulation on plant location. Greenstone (2001) analyzes the impacts of environmental regulation on industrial activities in the US during 1967-1987 by using data on both regulations
from the Clean Air Act Amendments and manufacturing activities. Similarly, List et al.
(2003) empirically show that birth of pollution-intensive plants respond to environmental
regulations, using New York State county-level data during 1980-1990.
Similarly, international and Cross-border aspect of pollution haven hypothesis suggests that
pollution-intensive industries will migrate to countries with lower environmental standards.
On the theoretical side, numerous authors have considered the effects of environmental
policies on international movement of capital (see for example, Copeland and Taylor, 1997;
Beladi et al., 2000; and Beladi and Oladi (2005)). On the empirical side, Xing and Kolstad
(2002) explore how lax environmental regulations and policies attract FDIs and influence
the location of polluting plants. Other empirical works such as Bradford et al. (2000), Kahn
(1998), List and Gallet (1999), and Selden and Song (1994) lend credence to the existence
of the EKC for gases such SO2 , nitrous oxide, CO , and SPM.
The current essay contributes to the above branches of literature by empirically analyzing the relationship between FDIs and the environment as well as examining the effect
of environmental aid to developing countries on their emissions. The relationship between
the environment and FDI stems from two perspectives: pollution haven hypothesis and the
EKC (Blanco et al., 2013). I employ these two perspectives simultaneously in the analyses.
I carry out the analyses on two gases; carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide. Also, I investigate
the existence of an EKC on total green house gas emissions for the energy, industrial and
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waste sectors and the effects of FDI and environmental aid on these emissions. Therefore,
the paper also contributes to a strand of literature that deals with foreign environmental
aid (see, for example, Copeland and Taylor, 1994; Chao and Yu, 1999, and more recently
Oladi and Beladi, 2015).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Following this introduction, I will
discuss the data in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the empirical model. I present the
empirical results in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes the paper.
4.4

Data
For the analyses of my model, I collected data on 27 developing countries.2 I employed

the World Bank’s definition of “developing country” in choosing the countries represented in
the model. The World Bank (2014) classifies countries into four main groups based on per
capita GNP: low income (0-$1,035), lower middle income ($1,036 - $4,085), upper middle
income ($4,086 - $12,615) and high income ($12,616 and above). Countries from the two
lower groups are classified as developing countries.3 Data was collected for the period 2002
to 2008 for these countries; I thus have a total of 189 observations for each variable of interest
employed in the analyses.
Data on environmental aid comes from the PLAID19 database and uses the environmental coding scheme developed by Hicks et al. (2008). Aid projects can be classified dirty,
neutral or environmental. Dirty aid might cause harm to the environment whiles environmental aid seeks to positively impact the environment. They can be sub-classified “strictly”
or “broadly” based on the intensity of the benefits or harm posed to the environment. Dirty
Strictly Defined (DSD) are “Projects that cause significant and immediate environmental
harm.” Dirty Broadly Defined (DBD) can be described as “Projects that will cause moderate environmental harm over the long term.”

Environmental Broadly Defined (EBD) refers

to “Projects that are preventive in nature or that produce less immediate, more long term
2

See Table 4..5 for a list of these countries. I include Russia whose status has been upgraded to
“developed” recently but within the time frame employed in this paper Russia was classified as “developing.”
3
“The use of this term is convenient; it is not intended to imply that all economies in the group
are experiencing similar development or that other economies have reached a preferred or final stage of
development. Classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status.”
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environmental benefits.” Environmental Strictly Defined (ESD) are “Projects expected to
produce significant, immediate environmental benefits”. Environmental aid projects can be
classified as brown or green: brown denotes environmental aid that goes towards projects
that produce environmental benefits for the recipient whilst green is used for projects that
have global benefits.4 Since I am interested in environmental aid, I use aid data classified
as EBD and ESD regardless of being green or brown. The environmental aid data was in
constant year 2000 US dollars so it needed to be converted to current US dollars. I did this
conversion using GDP deflator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The data on corruption and investment profile of a country come from the political risk
component of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data. The corruption rating
captures the extent of corruption in the political system. This index is more concerned
with corruption such as excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, and secret party
funding though it also considers other forms of corruption encountered by businesses such
as bribes associated with export licenses and exchange controls. I rescale this rating so that
it ranges from zero to one; where one denotes a very transparent country and zero denotes
a very corrupt country. The investment profile index captures all other factors that inhibit
investments that are not covered by other political, economic and financial risk components.
It is made up of the following subcomponents: contract viability, profits repatriation, and
payment delays. The investment profile is rescaled to range from 0 to 1 with the latter
denoting very low risk and the former denoting very high risk.
My data for nitrous oxide (N2 O) emissions come from the World Resource Institute
CAIT database. Nitrogen emissions are measured in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtco2 e). Data on total Green House Gas (GHG) emissions by sectors of an economy,
which is also measured in mtco2 e, are obtained from the World Resource Institute database
(WRI-CAIT (2014)). Total GHG comprises the six following gases; carbon dioxide (CO2 ),
nitrous oxide, methane (CH4), Hydrofluorocarbons, Perfluorocarbons, and Sulfur Hexafluoride. I use Environmental Performance Index (EPI) as a proxy for environmental regulation
4

Hicks et al. (2008) provide a thorough framework for classifying aid data by donor, recipient and the
intended purpose of the aid.
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stringency. I believe that environmental regulations and EPI move hand in hand. The EPI
data comes from SEDAC but was initially prepared by Yale Center for Environmental Law
and Policy.
I collected the data on population density, carbon dioxide, GNP per capita, manufacturing percentage of GDP, exports, imports, and total reserve from the World Bank. I use
total trade as a percentage of GDP to measure trade openness. Data on employment and
capital stock is from Penn World Trade (PWT 8.0). Data on net FDI inflows in current US
dollars were obtained from the UNCTAD STAT.Table 3.E.3 shows summary statistics for
the variables employed in the analysis.
4.5

Empirical Model
In my model I explore a linkage between emissions, net FDI inflows, and environmental

regulation stringency. Environmental regulation stringency influences the level of emissions
in a country since if regulations are very stringent the cost of polluting is high and vice
versa. That is, stringent environmental regulations can drive up production cost in a country. Xing and Kolstad (2002) explain that stringent environmental regulations are seen
to increase production cost by requiring specialized equipment to comply with regulation.
They also point out that very stringent regulations can decrease “waste disposal capacity”.
Environmental regulations also influence a country’s emissions through its trading activities.
If a country has lax environmental regulation vis-à-vis its trading partners, then it could see
investment inflows directed towards its “dirty” industries as explained by the pollution haven
hypothesis. The country with the lax environment regulation has comparative advantage in
the production of goods that are pollution intensive (see Cole, 2004).
Foreign Direct Investments can affect emissions depending on a number of factors,
some of which include: A) The sectors of the economy into which these funds flow; if
investments target the manufacturing industries one would expect emissions to increase. B)
The technology used in production in those factories also affects emissions in a country;
if the production process employs clean technology then emission would be lowered. This
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is referred to as the technique effect (see Grossman and Krueger, 1991).5 Environmental
regulations can affect emissions directly by increasing the cost of production in a country
and indirectly through FDIs and the pollution haven hypothesis.6
The relationship between FDI inflows and emissions (environment regulations) has long
been known to be determined simultaneously. In exploring this endogenous relationship between FDI’s and the level of pollution in a country, I consider two equations: The first being
the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). I consider the following equation to characterize
the Kuznets curve.
(4.1)

Eit = αi + Tt + β0 FDIit + γFDIit ∗ Cit + β1 Yit + β2 Y2it + β∗ M + Uit

where Eit represents emissions for country i at time t. αi is a time invariant individual
(country) specific effect which is normally unobserved. I include year and time fixed effects as
control variables. The intercept αi can capture any individual heterogeneity that might exist
in the model (factors that vary with each country present in the sample but not over time).
Tt captures certain phenomena such as technological advancement that might vary over time
independently of the sampled countries. FDIit denotes foreign direct investment inflow and
Cit represents level of corruption7 (corruptibility) with FDIit ∗Cit representing an interaction
between corruptibility and investment inflows as recommended in Cole et al. (2006). I
include this interaction because I expect that the level of corruption, political stability and
quality of government regulations could influence the impact of FDI on pollutions levels.
yit represents income of country i at time t. M contains other control variables I include
in the analyses such as manufacturing percent of GDP, population density, corruption, an
interaction term (a product of manufacturing percent of GDP and population density),
environmental performance index and environmental aid.
The signs of the slope coefficients can help in exploring economic relationship as well
as confirming a priori expectations gleaned from economic theory. The signs of β1 and β2
5
Grossman and Krueger (1991) as well as Copeland and Taylor (1994) explain that trade liberalization
can have a scale, technique and composition effect.
6
See He (2006) for a more intricate relationship between FDI, emissions, and environmental regulation.
7
My corruption variable ranges from 0 to 1 with high values denoting less corruptibility
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are probably the most important as they assess the validity of the EKC. I could have the
following combinations of β1 and β2 :
1. β1 = β2 = 0. In this case there exists no relationship between emissions and economic
development (Income).
2. If β1 > 0 (β1 < 0) and β2 = 0 then emissions is a monotonically increasing (decreasing)
function of income or economic development.
3. β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. This represents an inverted u-shaped relationship between emissions and income or development, which is what I want to see if the EKC holds true.
4. β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 give us a u-shaped relationship between emissions and income or
development.
One would expect that the effect of FDIs ( β 0 ) to have a positive effect on emissions. That
is, as investment inflows continue, coupled with the emergence of manufacturing plants,
emissions or environmental quality worsens. This however does not have to be the case
since through the diffusion of cleaner technologies and technique effect can cause emissions
to decrease even though investments increase. As stated earlier I expect β1 > 0 and β2 < 0
if inverted U-Shaped relationship exists.
The empirical validity of the EKC has been criticized quite extensively in some literatures. In the analyses I will tackle some of them as far as the analysis go. My empirical
model also tests whether there is empirical support for relationship between environmental
aid and emissions as stated by theoretical results of Chao and Yu (1999) and Oladi and
Beladi (2015).
The econometric model presented by equation (4.1) may have endogeneity problem
since endogenous relationship between FDI and emissions has been documented in both
theoretical and empirical literature, characterized as the pollution haven hypothesis. In my
analyses I get around the possible endogeneity of FDI in the EKC equation by instrumenting.
I instrument FDI by using an equation, which stems from the pollution haven hypothesis.
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This also enables us to analyze the effects of the PHH on the EKC.8 The PHH equation I
use in instrumenting FDI is given as:
(4.2)

FDIit = α1 EPIit + α2 OPENit + α3 RESit + α4 PROit

where EPI, OPEN, RES, and PRO represent environmental performance index, trade openness, total reserves, and investment profile respectively. Also with FDI being endogenous I
expect the interaction term FDIit ∗ Cit to be endogenous as well. I therefore instrument this
interaction term with lagged values of FDIit ∗ Cit . I argue the validity of the instrumenting
process as follows.
First, my instruments are relevant: regulations, investment profile, total reserves and
trade openness of a country influence the flow of foreign investment into it. If the PHH holds
true the weaker environmental regulations should attract investments into the country. One’s
a priori expectations would be that the better a country’s investment profile the more foreign
investments that flow into that country. A country’s openness to trade should affect FDI
inflows. The more open a country is to trade the more attractive that country is to investors.
A country’s total reserves comprises its current and capital accounts and reflects its exchange
rate policies and volatility. Thus, I would expect that a country with a more stable currency
would attract more investments. Also, a lagged version of an endogenous variable is a valid
instrument since I expect previous values of a phenomenon to be correlated with its current
values. Second, the instruments are exogenous in that they influence emissions only through
foreign investments. Third, the model is also over identified since the number of instruments
exceeds the number of endogenous regressors I have in the model.
4.6

Empirical Results
In addition to ample theoretical support for endogeneoity of FDI, I used Davidson-

MacKinnon test of exogeneity, which confirms the endogeneity of FDI in the empirical mode
that at 5% level of significance. To ascertain the validity of the instruments, I carry out a
8

Cole (2004) explains that for those who consider the cost of meeting environmental regulations to be
hefty the PHH further buttresses the point that EKC’s shape is caused by developed countries exporting
pollution to developing countries where costs of meeting environmental regulations are cheaper.

85
Sargan-Hansen test for over identifying restrictions. I cannot reject the null hypothesis which
states that the instruments are valid. I use robust standard errors in all of the estimated
equations to control for heteroscedasticity.9
The result of my estimates with CO2 emissions as the dependent variable is presented
in Table 4..3. The first model is an instrumented fixed effects model without controlling
for time effects.10 The second model however captures the effects of time. The results for
both models support the Environmental Kuznets curve with log of income as well as its
square all having the appropriate positive and negative signs, respectively. Their estimates
reveal that a one percent increase in GNP will lead to about 2.9 percent increase in average
carbon dioxide emissions in both models. This seems to support the Grossman and Krueger
(1991) idea of a scale effect that an increase in economic activity will lead to an increase in
emission. Then, degradation is expected to reduce as structural changes take place in the
economy. This can be evidenced from the sign on the square log of GNP. For both models I
also see that corruption has the expected sign and is significant. This suggests that curbing
corruption might be important in a government’s attempt to reduce its emissions, as also
claimed in López and Mitra (2000).
According to the estimates, the previous period’s environmental regulation stringency
seems to have no significant effect on the current investment inflows in both models. When
I include time fixed effects however, lagged environmental performance index gets the appropriate sign (i.e., expected negative sign).

A possible reason for why environmental

performance index is not significant in either of the models may be due to it being a weak
proxy for environmental regulation stringency. Another possibility might lie with the enforcement of environmental regulations in developing countries. Although the importance
of regulations in ensuring environmental quality and economic development is emphasize in
9

Perman and Stern (2003) state that EKC does not exist once one has accounted for certain econometric
phenomena as serial dependence. However serial correlation is not a problem in micro panels and the test
apply to macro panels with long time series of about 20 to 30 years (see Torres-Reyna, 2008). Hence, I
are not concerned since I have a short time series. I then use the STATA user-written program “xttest3”
to test homoscedastic errors. This program estimates a modified Wald statistic under the assumption of
homoscedasticity. The results show that I have heteroscedasticity.
10
Table4..2 shows the first stage results and all instruments used as well as other vital statistics.
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the literature (see Panayotou, 1997, and Dasgupta et al., 2002), the enforcement of environmental regulations in developing economies is weak and almost absent in some cases (see
Hettige et al., 1995).
The role of FDIs on the carbon dioxide emissions of the destination country is very
significant for both models. Without evaluating the effect of corruptibility on investment
inflows I see that FDI has a negative sign. This suggests that the inflow of foreign investment
into a country can improve its environment. However, the total effect of FDI on carbon
dioxide emission, once I account for corruptibility, is positive. The elasticity of carbon
dioxide emissions evaluated at the mean of corruption is about 0.04%. This would suggest
that emissions increase with the inflow of foreign investments, though this effect may be
minimal.
The results also reveal that as the level of manufacturing in a country increases, emissions in the country decreases. This negative effect of manufacturing activities on carbon
dioxide emissions is also significant. One possible explanation can be the existence of strong
technique effect. That is, although the level of manufacturing activities may be increasing,
cleaner technology is used in the production process due to technological diffusion from FDI.
Thus, higher level of manufacturing reduces emission. However, tracking the growth in technology is quite difficult since it is difficult to find a very effective index that captures all the
attributes of technology. Another possible explanation can be that due to adopting a more
stringent environmental regulation, coupled with high punitive consequences for polluters,
there might be an incentive for firms to adopt cleaner, efficient and environment friendly
means of production.11 Yet another possibility might be that foreign direct investment is
channeled towards industries that are more labor-intensive. One way to investigate this
would be to track the industries into which FDIs flow but this can be difficult to do for
developing countries due to the unavailability of quality data. I thus explore this possibility
by comparing the responsiveness of capital stock and employment to FDIs for the sampled
countries. Table 4..5 shows a comparison of the elasticity of capital and employment. All
11

Liang (2006) explains that due to foreign firms’ superior and more energy efficient technology, foreign
direct investment can improve environmental quality if foreign firms can crowd out local firms that cannot
compete against superior technology.

87
countries except Botswana had the capital being more responsive to foreign investment than
employment.
Environmental aid is not significant in either models but has the expected negative sign. The
negative sign implies that as the environmental aid increases, emission reduces. Arvin et al.
(2009) for instance show that industrialized developing countries with higher level of water
pollution receive more environmental aid. Whereas Chao and Yu (1999) demonstrate theoretically that environmental aid can be beneficial for both donor and recipient, Kretschmer
et al. (2010) corroborate my results that environmental aid might not be significant in alleviating environmental degradation. Their findings assert that though aid effectiveness may
reduce energy intensity, this does not spillover to emissions. They conclude that aid might
not help in mitigating climate change beyond reducing energy intensities and hint that for
emissions intensities to be reduced donors may have to “tie the recipients’ hand on how to
use aid.”
My estimates prove the existence of the EKC for CO2 even though Lopez (1994) posits
that the inverted U-shape relationship does not exist for global gases such as CO2 . Stern
(2004), however, mentions that recent literature show that there is no significant difference
between the effect on global and local emissions as far as income per capita is concerned. I
also consider other forms of emissions, as well as total GHG emissions for specific sectors in
my analyses. The estimates for those analyses are presented in the Table 4..4. A similar
analyses on nitrous oxide suggest that there is no evidence of EKC, in contrast to findings
of Selden and Song (1994). The coefficients of Log GNP and Square log GNP are of the
appropriate and expected sign. However, they are not significant. Here, environmental aid
also does not have the appropriate sign and it is not significant.
A look at Table 4..4 shows that EKC exists for total GHG emissions for the industrial
sectors. The implications of this could be that better and much greener technologies are
being used in those sectors as development and foreign investments increase. According to
1
my estimates, the point of inflection ( exp( −β
2β2 )) for total industrial GHG emissions is about

$7378. This figure lies within the range reported by existing literature. For example, Cole
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et al. (1997) in their analysis of emissions for 11 OECD countries had an inflection point of
$8232. Also, I see that the coefficient of environmental aid bears a negative sign. However,
once again, it is not significant. There is also no indication of technique effect as manufacturing percent of GDP is not significant in the model. Moreover, although the coefficient of
the Environmental Performance Index has the appropriate sign, it is not significant.
As for GHG from the energy sector, the results indicate a significant negative relationship between FDI and emission. But once I consider the effects of corruptions in imparting
FDI and evaluate corruption at the mean, then one percent increase in FDI inflows will
result in about a 0.02 percent average in GHG emissions.12 The coefficient of corruption
has the appropriate sign and is very significant. This suggest controlling corruption and
improving fairness could be key in alleviating environmental degradation. I also find evidence supporting the existence of EKC for GHG emissions for Energy sector. My estimates
reveal that a point of inflection of about $30,219 which falls within some reported points of
inflection. Stern and Common (2001) report an inflection point of about $101,166 for their
analysis on the emissions of 73 developed and developing countries. I also find that environmental aid is significant at the 10% level and it has the appropriate sign. This suggests
that projects funded through environmental aid reduce GHG emissions in the energy sector.
Manufacturing percent of GDP is significant at the 5% level and has an inverse relationship
with GHG emissions. This testifies to the possible existence of a technique effect or the use
of cleaner and more efficient technology in the production of energy.
The waste sector however shows no apparent EKC relationship between GHG and
economic development. Even though log of GNP and its square bear the appropriate sign
they are however not significant. This is not surprising as Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992)
show that economic development cannot be associated with reductions in waste generation.
All other variables are insignificant except for population density which is significant at the
1% level.
12

It captures the net effect of FDI on emissions once I evaluate corruption at the mean. That is
(-0.175+0.542(0.36)) where 0.36 is the mean value for corruption index

89
4.7

Conclusion
This essay studies the existence of the Environmental Kuznets Curve for CO2 , and GHG

emissions in three specific sectors: industrial, waste, and energy for 27 developing countries.
It also explores the possibility of a technique effect or a possible diffusion of cleaner and
superior technology into the economy of developing countries. Moreover, it attempts to
investigate the effects of environmental aid on emissions.
I find that the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) exists for carbon dioxide (CO2 )
even though some might consider it to be a global gas. I however find that contrary to what
some researchers propose, an EKC does not exist for Nitrous oxide. I also discover that
for these developing countries, as the level of manufacturing in the respective economies
increases, emissions decline. I have multiple possible explanation for this result. First, this
can be due to the technique effect. Second, it may be because of inflow of FDIs to industries
that are more labor intensive. Third, firms may be adopting cleaner technology in order
to avoid high punitive measures that come with more stringency environmental regulations.
Another finding of this paper is that yesterday’s environmental regulation seems to have
no effect on the today’s emissions. This can be due to weak enforcement and monitoring
institutions in developing countries. Developing countries would have to focus on improving
their enforcement and monitoring institutions if their environmental policies are to succeed.
For the Green House Gases (GHG), I find that an inverted u-shaped relationship does
not exist between income and emissions for the waste sector. However, I find evidence of
the EKC for the energy and industrial sector. There is also a hint of technique effect for the
energy sector as I found GHG emissions diminish as manufacturing as a percentage GDP
increases. I also discover that environmental aid is efficient in reducing emissions from the
production of energy.
Environmental aid is not significant for all other forms of emissions or pollutants in
the model. This would imply that in the case of developing countries, the disbursement
of environmental aid should come with stringent condition and effective monitoring from
donor countries. This would ensure that projects funded through environmental aid are
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completed and funds for such projects are not misappropriated. Also, if there is a “race to
the bottom” by developing countries in order to attract more FDI inflows then an influx
of environmental aid might not be enough to improve environmental quality or alleviate
environmental degradation.
This essay can be extended in a couple of ways. One can focus on the sectors into
which foreign investments flow and its effects on emissions in developing countries. As
another avenue for future research, one may focus on tracking explicitly the development
of technology and the impact of technology diffusion in developing countries and how they
affect emissions in those countries.
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Appendices

Table 4..1: Variable Summary
Variable Obs
Mean
Environmental Performance Index 189
50.86413
Environmental Aid 188 2.04E+08
Investment Profile 189
0.696834
Corruption 189
0.361499
Population Density 189
128.7509
Carbon Dioxide 189
431311.7
GNP per capita 187
7028.182
Total Reserves 189 7.16E+10
Nitrous oxide (N2 0) 188
50.74923
Waste(GHG) 188
24.8171
Industrial(GHG) 188
39.4606
Energy(GHG) 181
450.2939
Trade Openness 189
77.51304
Employment 189 6.53E+07
Capital Stock 189 2.19E+12
Manufacturing Percent of GDP 180
19.33189
FDI 189 1.02E+10

Statistics
Std. Dev.
7.759704
3.42E+08
0.143989
0.119692
209.6938
1121477
3896.759
2.17E+11
87.01143
40.19456
130.3029
1100.147
39.17147
1.59E+08
4.60E+12
6.75183
2.28E+10

Min
35.03426
484607.2
0.3125
0.166667
1.572666
3043.61
970
2.04E+08
0.1968
0.144053
0.003241
3.404504
25.20866
861218.8
2.46E+10
3.645126
-5.97E+08

Max
69.32507
2.19E+09
0.958333
0.75
1136.744
7037710
19850
1.97E+12
403.5754
193.8494
851.6931
6919.306
210.3743
7.72E+08
3.24E+13
35.63192
1.72E+11
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VARIABLES
Corruption

Table 4..2: First Stage Results
log FDI
FDI * corruption

-1.436**
21.89***
(0.647)
(0.407)
EPI
0.0124
-0.00614
(0.0455)
(0.0204)
interaction1
-0.00024
-0.000367***
(0.00035)
(0.00013)
Log of GNP
1.715
-0.892
(3.014)
(1.169)
Square log GNP
0.00272
0.0977
(0.184)
(0.0689)
Log of Environmental Aid
0.0415
0.0279
(0.0352)
(0.0171)
Manufacturing per GDP
0.0609
0.0443*
(0.0438)
(0.0239)
Population density
0.0101
0.0085
(0.0184)
(0.00568)
Investment profile
3.179***
1.045**
(0.812)
(0.436)
Trade Openness
0.00962*
0.00734***
(0.00557)
(0.00211)
Total reserves
0.285*
-0.00358
(0.154)
(0.0637)
FDI*corruption(t-1)
0.014
0.00862
(0.0286)
(0.0122)
Observations
173
173
R-squared
0.73
0.988
F-Statistics
5.8
4.59
Number of countries
27
27
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 4..3: Estimation Results
(1)
ln_co2

VARIABLES
Log of FDI

-0.163***
(0.0591)
0.565***
(0.151)
-12.74***
(3.376)
0.00232
(0.00542)

-0.170***
(0.0607)
0.554***
(0.153)
-12.54***
(3.434)
-0.000618
(0.00691)

0.000228***

0.000244***

(6.77e-05)
2.891***
(0.659)
-0.144***
(0.0350)
-0.00738
(0.00663)

(7.55e-05)
2.845***
(0.650)
-0.142***
(0.0335)
-0.00717
(0.00627)

-0.0258**

-0.0288**

(0.0123)
-0.00579**
(0.00252)
173
0.620
27
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(0.0142)
-0.00622**
(0.00271)
173
0.647
27

FDI*corruption
corruption
EPIt-1
Manufacturing
percent*Population Density
Log of GNP
Square of log GNP
Log of Environmental aid
Manufacturing percent of
GDP
Population density
Observations
R-squared
Number of countries

(2)
ln_co2
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Table 4..4: Nitrous Oxide and GHG Emissions by Sector
VARIABLES
Log FDI
FDI*corruption
Corruption
EPI(t-1)
Manufacturing percent*Population
Density
Log GNP
Square log GNP
Log
aid

Environmental

Manufacturing
cent of GDP

per-

Population density
Observations
R-squared
Number of Countries

Log Nitrous
oxide

Log Industrial
(GHG)

Log Waste
( GHG)

Log Energy
(GHG)

0.0504
(0.0379)
-0.166*
(0.0910)
3.590*
(2.042)
-0.00534
(0.00390)

0.150
(0.121)
-0.0501
(0.354)
1.078
(7.892)
-0.00293
(0.0133)

-0.0362
(0.0255)
-0.0400
(0.0743)
0.870
(1.657)
-0.00138
(0.00368)

-0.175***
(0.0543)
0.542***
(0.117)
-12.27***
(2.631)
0.000264
(0.00601)

-6.30e-05*

-6.88e-05

-4.74e-05

0.000209***

(3.45e-05)
0.792
(0.528)
-0.0417
(0.0286)

(0.000119)
3.901***
(1.238)
-0.219***
(0.0713)

(3.00e-05)
0.305
(0.350)
-0.00732
(0.0192)

(5.88e-05)
2.414***
(0.574)
-0.117***
(0.0300)

0.00485

-0.00134

0.00209

-0.00958*

(0.00303)

(0.0193)

(0.00265)

(0.00570)

0.000996

0.00150

0.00314

-0.0260**

(0.00569)
0.00225
(0.00148)
173
0.424
27

(0.0179)
-0.00489
(0.00498)
173
0.301
27

(0.00510)
0.00238*
(0.00126)
173
0.519
27

(0.0116)
-0.00409*
(0.00245)
166
0.680
26

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4..5: Employment and Capital Elasticities
country Average of elasticity of employment Average of elasticity of capital
Argentina
Armenia
Bangladesh
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Mongolia
Pakistan
Paraguay
Philippines
Romania
Russia
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay

0.159576
-0.0711
-0.04068
0.371389
0.040153
0.029955
0.133096
0.563188
0.039746
0.17863
0.099521
-0.33738
0.216667
0.041056
0.021498
0.002844
-0.28719
0.068461
-0.16259
0.009247
0.092171
-0.04876
0.309334
0.079401
-0.02747
0.016038
-0.0314

0.393595
-0.1926
-0.25337
0.214422
0.022029
0.158737
-0.01139
7.05001
0.149358
0.330358
0.225808
-0.38598
0.392858
0.196033
0.114091
-0.07503
-3.90961
0.139398
-0.26632
0.010719
0.101793
0.263318
2.051797
0.178437
0.406852
0.048066
-0.04085
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation focuses on issues pertaining to corruption, environmental degradation
(emissions) and economic development as well as trade in merchandise and services. First,
it studied how society may approach corruption at different facets of economic development.
Using a neoclassical growth model in which individuals allocate their income to consumption,
investment, and corruption reduction activities, the dissertation showed that corruption and
income or economic development have an inverted u-shaped relationship. This suggests that
at lower levels of income corruption tends to be increasing in income but the reverse holds
at higher income levels. This is due to the fact that, at lower levels putting bread on the
table takes priority over fighting corruption.
An empirical analysis on the proposed inverted u-shaped relationship between corruption and income was conducted. It employed a panel dataset on 75 countries for the periods
2001 to 2008 and a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation results lent support to the
existence of an inverted u-shape relationship between corruption and income. Also confirmed
by the results, is the view that corruption and war are directly related. The results indicate
that incidences of war would increase the corruption index by 8.3 points. Trade openness is
also found to be significant in determining corruption levels in a country. The results also
point to the fact that trade openness leads to a reduction in a country’s corruption.
Literature suggests that government expenditure may induce corrupt acts in a country. Contrarily, the results indicate that this may not necessarily be the case. The results
reveal that corruption levels reduce with increased government spending. The results also
indicate that socio-economic conditions and natural resource rents are significant factors in
determining a country’s level of corruption.
Additionally, this dissertation explores linkages between merchandise and service trade.
It makes the argument that merchandise and service trade are simultaneously determined.
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The theoretical framework employs a general equilibrium model in developing this proposition. In this model, countries are endowed with fixed amount of a specific service input and
produce a traded commodity using these services.
The empirical investigation of this proposed simultaneity uses panel data on 24 OECD
countries and their trading partners covering the periods 2000 to 2006. It uses a fixed effects
estimation method and a Heckman selection model to account for zero-trade flows. The
empirical investigation validates the proposed relationship between merchandise and service
trade. The results also indicate that both merchandise and service trade are significant
in determining each other. Distance, the population and income of the trading parties
are confirmed to be significant in determining trade flows between countries. The results
also show that having a common colonizer post 1945, is more likely to promote trade in
merchandise that for services trade.
Lastly, the dissertation explored the impact of environmental aid on emissions in developing countries. It made use of two well known concepts; the pollution haven hypothesis and
the environment Kuznets curve in studying empirically, the effects of foreign direct investment and income on emissions in developing countries. I was also interested in ascertaining
whether developing countries benefited from trading with the more developed nations by way
of a reduction in emissions through the diffusion of cleaner technologies. The dissertation
considered emissions from the industrial, waste, and energy sectors.
The analysis was conducted on carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and total Green House Gas
emissions for 27 developing countries. The results confirm the existence of an EKC for carbon
dioxide but reveal that an EKC may not exist for nitrous oxide. The results also hint at a
positive impact of a technique effect on emissions in developing countries evidenced by the
fact that emissions decline as manufacturing increases. This may also imply that firms may
be employing cleaner technologies to avoid exorbitant fines from environmental regulation
agencies. Interestingly, environmental regulations do not influence emissions in developing
countries. This may be as a result of weak enforcement and monitoring institutions in the
developing countries. Environmental aid is significant in reducing emissions in the energy
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sector but not significant for all other pollutants. The EKC was found to exist for GHG
emissions from the energy and industrial sectors.
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